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INTRODUCTION	
  
	
  	
  
The upsurge in Islamist-based terrorism has thrust the concept of radicalism to the
forefront of political and academic vocabulary, and it has become the “main frame for
explaining, and preventing young Muslims from engaging in radical activities” (Sedgwick qtd. in
Lindekilde). Following the September 11 (9/11) terrorist attack on the United States in 2001,
concepts such as “home grown terrorism” have become increasingly salient. In the United States,
there is also heightened concern for the safety of American citizens, as well as an increased
suspicion of people from nations such as Iraq and Afghanistan. As the “War on Terror”
continues, I turn my eye to the small country of Denmark, which has recently joined the United
States and Belgium in combatting fighters from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and
other extremist groups.
Denmark’s involvement in the War on Terror is partly because of its vested interest in
decreasing the presence of Danish Muslims in Iraq and Syria, who have gone to fight alongside
extremist groups such as ISIS. Thomas Hegghammer, Director of Terrorism Research at the
Norwegian Defense Research Establishment noted, “Denmark has a large radicalized
environment compared to the size of the country” (Nissen, “Inside ISIS: The Making of a
Radical”). Adding to the concern is the enduring tension between the Danish majority and
Muslims following the 9/11 attacks, as well as the subsequent policies targeting Muslims.
Although the angst about radicalization has its roots in security concerns, it is also related to a
wider debate on how Western liberal democracies should relate to, and integrate, especially
Muslim minorities [sic]” (Lindekilde 110). 	
  
Traditionally, Denmark has been known as a progressive and liberal country, tolerant
towards alternative beliefs and lifestyles while still emphasizing the importance and value of
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social cohesion and equality (Mouritsen and Olsen 691). “It was the first to legalize pornography
and recognize gay marriages” (Mouritsen and Olsen 691). Known for its functioning welfare
system and its interest and involvement in international human rights issues, Denmark has shown
itself to be an international contender and defender of the rights of others, including minorities.
Denmark’s international position as a global humanitarian promoter is evidenced by its long list
of signed and ratified human rights conventions and treaties, which it is obligated to uphold (see
Appendix). Recognized as the world’s happiest nation by the “World Happiness Report” in 2012
and 2013 (“Happiest in the World”), and ranked first on the list of “world’s most responsible
governments” by the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index, on the basis of government
accountability and criminal justice (Botero et al. 54), Denmark has amassed an impressive
international record. 	
  
Denmark made headlines once again in 2014 with the implementation of a landmark law
allowing transgender men and women to legally change their gender. The first of its kind in
Europe, this law has garnered international attention, especially because of Amnesty
International’s 2014 report, The State Decides Who I Am, which reveals the Human Rights
violations of other European countries against people trying to change their gender (“World
Must Follow Denmark’s Example”). Heralded by Amnesty International as a “progressive and
courageous step,” the organization says that the world should follow Denmark’s example
(“World Must Follow Denmark’s Example”).
Domestically, however, Denmark’s standard of human rights engagement for religious
and ethnic minorities (namely immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers) has not been as
impressive. Denmark’s treatment of women, refugees and asylum seekers, for instance, has put
the country in violation of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
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(CEDAW) as well as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) policies
towards refugees and asylum seekers (“Denmark Human Rights”). Despite Denmark’s glowing
reviews from Rule of Law Index, the document also criticized the state on “police discrimination
against foreigners and ethnic minorities,” and noted this a “problem” (54). In the same light, a
recent article from Amnesty International outlined its treatment of refugees and asylum seekers: 	
  
•

In August [2013], in the middle of the night, police raided a church in Copenhagen, and
detained a number of Iraqi asylum-seekers who had sheltered there for months. There
were complaints that the police used excessive force to remove people who were
demonstrating in solidarity with the asylum-seekers. 	
  

•

During the year [2013], 38 Iraqi asylum-seekers were forcibly returned to Iraq, including
at least 25 to central and southern Iraq contrary to the advice of UNHCR, the UN refugee
agency. 	
  

•

Newly arrived refugees and other aliens were still only entitled to between 45 and 65 per
cent of regular welfare benefits, giving rise to concern that this would lead to their being
destitute. (“Denmark Human Rights”)	
  

Although the Danish list of human rights violations is comparatively shorter than many other
countries, Denmark’s struggle with addressing immigrant affairs makes this one of Denmark’s
key shortcomings, gravely impacting ethnic and religious minorities in Denmark. 	
  
The state of religious and ethnic minorities in the country is, perhaps now more than ever,
an important part of the human rights discourse. The increase in Danish Muslims’ involvement
in extremist activities with groups such as ISIS (which is well known for a wave of beheadings
as well as the kidnappings of numerous women) has sparked a response from Denmark that is
unlike many other European countries. In an article from the Guardian, David Crouch and Jon
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Henley noted, “Denmark has produced more fighters per head of population since 2012 than any
other Western European country except Belgium. [Therefore]…Denmark has been at the
forefront of exploring new models for preventing extremism” (“A Way Home for Jihadis”). In
addition to joining the military fights against ISIS, Denmark has begun a de-radicalization
program for jihadi fighters returning from Syria. 	
  
This initiative is the successor to another radicalization prevention project the Danish
government embarked on in 2008, an action plan called “A Common and Safe Future.” The
project was to be overseen by the Center for Prevention – a sector of the Danish Security and
Intelligence Service (PET). According to the PET, the goal of the program was to “encourage
people to change their behaviour towards a non-extremist direction by means of direct contact
and dialogue. The idea [was] for PET to support the actors that are best placed to reach
vulnerable people by equipping them with tools for tackling the difficult challenges” (“The
Centre for Prevention”). 	
  
Lasse Lindekilde, a researcher in the Department of Political Science at Aarhus
University in Denmark, notes that “A Common and Safe Future” has been targeted towards
Muslims, thus suggesting that Muslims are violence-prone “radicals” who should be encouraged
to become active citizens in Danish society (110). Lindkelde also asserted that the action plan
would have “inotropic effects” due to its programming structure as well as its hard focus on
Muslims (110). With Denmark’s shift in focus from radicalization prevention to deradicalization, along with the general salience in discourse on terrorism and radicalization, this
thesis asks the question: “Have Denmark’s immigration and integration policies contributed to
the growing radicalization of the Muslim minority in the country?” 	
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Denmark was once a largely homogeneous nation before the rise of immigration in the
1970’s. The inflow of immigrants from Turkey, Pakistan, the former Yugoslavia and Morocco
onto Danish soil triggered a set of social and political changes in reaction to the emerging
diversity. Chapter One will provide an overview of Denmark before the rise in immigration, and
also examine the changes in the social and political climate following the increase in immigrants.
Chapter One will also chronicle the rise of the immigrant presence in Denmark, starting with
immigrants who were considered “guest workers” and then immigrants fleeing to the country to
escape the Yugoslav war. In Chapter One, I show that perceptions of immigrants to Denmark
changed – negatively – as immigrant rates increased. Immigrants went from being “welcomed”
as “guests” who provide cheap labor, to being perceived as a social problem and potential burden
to the welfare state (Jønsson 593). The rise of anti-immigration organizations, and the rise in far
right populism also advanced the discourse on immigration in Denmark. 	
  
Focusing on the years following 9/11, Chapter Two discusses the Danish emphasis on the
integration/assimilation of the migrant population, as evidenced by the gradual tightening of
Denmark’s citizenship laws during the years 2002, 2004, 2005, 2008 and 2010. Chapter Two
also explores the impact immigration laws had on immigrants’ chances of receiving Danish
citizenship. From this, I reveal the underlying bias towards certain immigrants over others, and
the resulting divide between the “good” and “bad” immigrants. In Chapter Two, I trace the
construction of Danish immigration policy through the influence of several factors: religion,
Danish language, pride in the welfare state and Grundtvigian philosophy. Overall, Chapter Two
provides a conceptual understanding of the Danish philosophy of integration, while also
revealing the ways in which the desire to protect the Danish culture and belief system has
informed their policies and, in turn, impacted immigrants.
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Chapter Three focuses on the adoption of internal and external securitization measures in
Denmark after the September 11 attacks in the USA. Key to the discussion is an analysis of the
ways in which Denmark’s cultural and religious history merged with this larger event, to create a
set of policies targeting Muslim immigrants and Muslims living in Denmark. Chapter Three
reveals the normalization of a deep distrust of Muslims living in Denmark, and of immigrants
from Islamic countries, after 9/11, as well as the restructuring of the Muslim image into “the
usual suspects.” In Chapter Three, I discuss how immigration, integration and security have
intersected in crucial ways. I also review the infamous Cartoon Controversy, an event that
sparked a debate between Muslims and the majority on free speech versus discrimination, while
simultaneously triggering an outcry from the Muslim community that was so large it marked the
first time since the Thirty Years War that a conflict with religious connotations had such an
impact in Danish society (Rudling 76). 	
  
Chapter Four examines the Muslim response to their constant state of hyper-visibility
brought on by the media, the policies focused on them, as well as their social encounters with the
majority. It chronicles the ways in which Muslims have chosen to cope with the situation in
Denmark, showing that some have elected to use the hyper-visibility as a way to affirm their
identity as Muslims, while others have either decided to withdraw from the public sphere or
leave Denmark entirely, in search of a place where they will feel welcomed. Personal anecdotes
cited from focus groups and interviews with several Danish Muslims supplement the discussion
of policies and practices discussed in the previous chapters. Chapter Four examines the growth in
the number of radicalized Muslims in Denmark and the ways in which the government is trying
to address this issue. 	
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Overall, this thesis outlines the demographic and political shifts in Denmark, which have
contributed to its transformation from liberalism to nationalism. The thesis shows how domestic
socio-political and cultural changes, as well as critical international events have played a role in
establishing the importance of “Danishness,” while simultaneously causing apprehension
towards anything or anyone that is considered “un-Danish.” The result is a weariness of different
cultures and religions, as demonstrated in Denmark’s political atmosphere, which favors
immigrant integration or assimilation over multiculturalism.
This notion of “welfare chauvinism and the idea of cultural homogeneity as a stabilizing
factor [in society]” (Huysmans 753) is what makes the integration of migrant minorities difficult.
Denmark’s immigration and integration policies, as they currently stand, are worrisome – not
just because of their impact on Muslim migrant minorities – but also because they speak to the
“wider politics of belonging, that is the struggle over cultural, racial and socio-economic criteria
for the distribution of rights and duties in a community” (Huysmans 753). With ISIS still actively
recruiting fighters to Syria,1 maintaining policies that lead to the creation of a disenfranchised
population may defeat the purpose of having a de-radicalization program to begin with.
On a broader scale, this is not just a Danish problem. It extends to other European
countries such France, Austria and the Netherlands. No strangers to controversy, these countries
have also had various incidences of cross-cultural tensions, as demonstrated by the Charlie
Hebdo shootings in France (Vinograd et al.,“Charlie Hebdo”), the assassination of Theo Van
Gogh in the Netherlands for his controversial film about Muslim culture (“Gunman Kills Dutch
Film Director”) and the 2015 reform to the 1912 Islam Law in Austria, banning foreign funding
for Muslims and Imams (“Austria Passes Controversial Reforms to 1912 Islam Law”).
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Citing information from French authorities on the fighters joining ISIS, Richard Barrett, Senior Vice President of
the Soufan Group, identifies ISIS recruits as “disaffected, aimless and lacking a sense of identity or belonging” (18).	
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CHAPTER 1
The Transformation of the Liberal State

Denmark today is often associated with its notion of homogeneity and smallness, tying in
with the Danish model of egalitarianism and democracy (Mouritsen and Olsen 697). Less known
is that Denmark was once a multinational power that ruled over territories in the Caribbean,
Norway, southern Sweden, northern Germany and elsewhere (Campbell and Hall 21).
Denmark’s territory was gradually diminished due to invasions (most notably the 1941 Nazi
invasion of Denmark) and repeated lost wars that resulted in lost territory. The depletion of
territory also led to decreased ethnic and linguistic diversity. Effectively, the loss of a
heterogeneous mix of people resulted in a loss of multiculturalism, and gave birth to ethnic and
linguistic homogenization (Campbell and Hall 22). These factors facilitated the conditions under
which the Danish state could become ‘right-sized’ and ‘right-peopled’ in the sense that its
homogeneity “created a strong, politically stable, and unified nation with a strong national
identity” (Campbell and Hall 22). This identity, which was centered on the preservation of the
Danish language, history and culture, became the foundation upon which Denmark was rebuilt
after losing its territories. The focus on things considered inherently Danish and symbolic of the
Danish identity is what I believe paved the way for the evolution of Denmark into a nation that
placed egalitarianism above multiculturalism.
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The Establishment of Danish Customs
“Through language and history, a cultural nation is fashioned”
(E.F Fain 80)
The development of a Danish national identity began during the 17th century and peaked
in the 19th century primarily because of the influence of the teachings of Nikolaj Frederik
Grundtvig. Grundtvig and a dedicated group of supporters “took it upon themselves to define for
Danish population their national identity” with teachings that surpassed social class divisions and
stressed the importance of individual freedom, volunteerism, classic liberalism, popular
education, free association and the development of civil society and social solidarity (Campbell
and Hall 22). Education thus became a fundamental part of establishing national identity through
the formation of Grundtvigian schools, which emphasized the teaching of Danish history, poetry
and literature (Campbell and Hall 22).
Grundvig’s teachings stressed the importance of learning the mother tongue/native
language, and highlighted the concept of Denmark as the “fatherland” (Fain 80). Grundtvig
believed that it was “natural for a child to speak his mother tongue, so it was natural for a people
to speak its native language” (Fain 80). Grundtvig warned Danes “their souls would shrivel if
they continued to speak German [and] he mocked them with an old proverb about French clothes
looking ridiculous during a Danish winter” (Fain 80). Grundtvig believed that language and
history were essential to Danes becoming their true selves. He saw “literature as the mirror of a
people’s spirit and history [as] not only the record of a people’s growth but the manifestation of
God’s divine plan” (Fain 80). Therefore, it was incumbent upon Danes to use their own language
and know their own history in order to “express their essential spirit” (Fain 80).
Initial literature on the fatherland theory portrays it as positioning Denmark as “the
country in which one is citizen,” which meant that all members of the Danish state were
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considered citizens, regardless of their place of birth and language (Brincker 356). This changed
when an alternative definition of “fatherland” emerged a few years later, describing the term as
exclusively representative of a shared language and place of birth (Brincker 356).
Grudtvig’s teachings fueled the growing interest in the Danish language and history and
the growing acceptance of the alternative definition of fatherland. This new interest was
interpreted by historians as an indication of a “growing national interest,” which ultimately led to
other things such as the creation of nationally engaged groups that published literature about
Denmark as the “fatherland” (Brincker 356). The Law of Indigenous Rights symbolized the first
step towards Danish nationalism. The law “restricted the occupation of official positions to
people born within the borders of the Danish state” (Brincker 357). Although this law largely
resulted from an increasing antagonistic view of Germans, the law was received positively
(Brinckser 357) and is, in my opinion, a key piece of legislation demonstrating the shift towards
a more nationalist agenda.

The Rise of Immigration in Denmark
Denmark’s change in attitude towards minority groups, particularly immigrants, was
triggered by the rise of immigration and integration policies in Denmark after the 1960’s. The
late 1960’s to early 1970’s were Denmark’s golden years, reflecting the expansion of the welfare
state (Jønsson 593). During these years, Denmark, along with other Western European countries
welcomed labor migrants, refugees and family reunifications from countries such as Turkey,
Pakistan, the former Yugoslavia and Morocco. The immigrant workers were welcomed to fill
labor shortages, because the demand for labor exceeded the national labor force (Moore 361).
The immigrants occupied largely the “lower-tier economic positions” (Moore 358). Nonetheless,
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they were now in a society that promoted universal social rights as well as a highly unionized
workforce (Jønsson 593).
These benefits resulted in rising concerns in the social and political spheres about the
future of immigrant workers on the country. In the social sphere, a general consensus existed
amongst Danish citizens that the immigrant workers would not stay. Therefore, they were
regarded as either gæstearbejdere (guest workers) or fremmedarbejdstagere (foreign workers),
thus suggesting that immigrant workers occupied a place of “otherness” from the wider Danish
society (Moore 361). In the political sphere, “the guest-worker issue” became the topic of debate,
as politicians discussed the concerns about how the universal welfare state could and should deal
with the problems associated with immigration (Jønsson 593). In Denmark, the main problems
included language barriers, discrimination in the labor and housing markets, facilitating leisure
time activities, etc. (Jønsson 593).
Initially, administrative changes and policies were attempted in order to assess,
understand and then solve some of the political concerns (Jønsson 593). To start, the ElkærHansen Commission was appointed by the Minister of Labor in 1969 to examine the entryrelated political issues as well as immigrant-policy implications regarding guest workers’ social
problems and adaptation to Danish society. To ensure equality and avoid stigmatization, the
Danish government included immigrants in the welfare-state system, assuring them the same
rights and social-welfare as Danish citizens. To cement this policy, a guest worker was employed
as a staff consultant at the Ministry of Social Affairs (Jønsson 593–594). Altogether, these were
seen as ad hoc solutions in the absence of a genuine immigration policy.
Immigration issues in Denmark took a further turn in 1973, following the oil crisis and
subsequent recession that impacted the country (Fernandez and Jensen 1140). Adopting the
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larger European pattern of closing borders to foreign labor, by prohibiting labor importation –
with the exception of political refugees and family reunifications – Denmark also closed its
borders to foreign labor, thus stopping the entry of new guest workers (Jønsson 593). This meant
that only political refugees and family reunifications could obtain a permanent resident permit in
Denmark. By this time, however, many guest workers had already earned the right to stay in the
country, after already being there for some time. The absence of a comprehensive immigration
policy, or official political reform to solve the challenges connected to immigration (such as
increased pressure on the housing market and immigrants’ difficulties entering the labor market
in an economic recession), left room for other political actors to “set the agenda, propose
solutions and promote visions for the early Danish integration policy” (Jønsson 593).
The aforementioned perception of immigrant workers being “guest workers” is key to
understanding why a comprehensive immigrant policy was not yet developed. This idea of
temporality “constituted the dominant policy framework in Denmark” (Jønsson 595), and thus
created a divide in what were considered Denmark’s fundamental values. On the one hand, the
universal welfare state was aimed at social integration, reducing inequality and so on (Jønsson
595). On the other hand, the role of immigrant workers was to “repatriate once the economic
boom came to an end,” therefore creating no good reason to have a national integration policy
(Jønsson, 595).

The Change: Immigrants as the Social Problem
Politically, the debate on the establishment of a national immigration/integration policy
was heightening in the early 1970’s (Jønsson, 595). The Socialist People’s Party was in favor of
the creation of a coherent immigration policy, whereas the Conservative Party was not. The
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Socialist People’s Party argued that the added support for immigrants was to come from state
funding, as well as the employers of immigrant workers. Employers, whose interests were
represented by the Conservative Party, were utterly opposed to this idea (Jønsson 595). Jens
Fisker, the head of the employers’ organization was quoted as saying, “the guest workers are
especially welcome first and foremost because this reserve does not cost anything, in contrary to
a reserve of unemployed or housewives. If we do not need the labor, it can just be deported”
(Schwartz qtd. in Jønsson 596). The concern, at the time, was regarding immigrant workers
undercutting the wages of Danish workers or becoming the “new underclass in society” (Jønsson
596).
One of the biggest issues for immigrants was finding housing. The Vognmandsmarken
controversy created a real problem for the Danish political system, which was criticized for the
poor quality and slum-like conditions in which guest workers and immigrants were living
(Jønsson 598). Deemed a “tragic effect” of the lack of political action in the housing policy,
Ludvig Hansen from the Danish Communist Party agreed to continue the characteristic Danish
“left-wing-line” towards immigrants on the grounds that since Denmark invited immigrant
workers to the country, the Danish political system was obliged to provide adequate
accommodations for them (Jønsson 598).
With the social democratic stronghold in the country, the left-wing line was maintained in
other ways. In 1983, a liberal law was passed. Considered one of the most liberal laws in the
world at the time, the 1983 immigration law gave refugees the “legal right to asylum and family
reunification. Immigrants (including immigrant workers already residing in Denmark) enjoyed
the full rights of the welfare state and could vote in local elections after three years of residence”
(Mouritsen and Olsen 691). Speaking in regard to the law, Bjorn Elmquist of the Liberal Party in
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Denmark stated that “the law created a big consistent link between fighting for human rights ‘in
the big world' and not discriminating on the basis of nationality ‘here at home in our own
house’” (Jensen qtd. in Mouritsen and Olsen 694). This idea of social citizenship and community
heightened the recognition of Denmark as a pinnacle of internationalism and humanitarianism. It
also made Denmark an attractive option for immigrants. By allowing guest workers access to
these rights, Denmark became a secure option for them and their families through family
reunification. Family reunification therefore meant a further influx of immigrants and the
children of immigrants.
The inception of the 1983 immigration law also marked the heightening of concerns with
immigration on the political and social spheres. Mass immigration was perceived as a threat to
two important factors of the Danish society: the welfare economy and Danish culture. The slight
uneasiness that emerged in the 1970s was about to become more serious. By the mid 1980s, the
inexpensive labor migrants were replaced by asylum seekers and refugees, creating a more
noticeable shift in the Danish perceptions of immigrants (Moore 358). As the demand for the
labor of migrant workers decreased, and the number of asylum seeking refugees increased,
Danish attitudes towards immigrants began to deteriorate (Moore 358).
In the mid 1980s and early 1990s, the majority of refugees were arriving from the IranIraq war and the civil wars of Sri Lanka and the former Yugoslavia (Mouritsen and Olsen 694).
The rising concern about immigrants was connected to issues of residential segregation and
social problems. During a parliamentary debate in the early 1980s, a conservative MP was
quoted as saying that accepting families with “roots in cultures which deviate from the Danish
[culture]...would...lead to many tragedies for the families in question” (Hagensen qtd. in
Mouritsen and Olsen 694). The issue was focused on how immigrants were to live on ‘an equal
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footing’, given the differences in cultures (Mouritsen and Olsen 694). In the political sphere,
immigration/integration was becoming a more prominent issue. The number of voters expressing
concern about immigration grew from four percent in 1989 to 25 in 1998 (Moore 358). The polls
indicated, “immigration issues superseded unemployment, taxes and the economy as the single
most important concern to voters” (Moore 358).
By this point, Denmark was struggling with rising unemployment rates in the unskilled
labor and lower-level management sectors due to shifting employment trends resulting from
globalization (Moore 358). Language barriers and low education levels for immigrants were of
particular concern (Mouritsen and Olsen 694). Politically, there was still an emphasis on equal
rights. However, more weight was placed on the “duty of immigrants to make an effort to
integrate and become economically self-supporting” (Mouritsen and Olsen 694). This marked the
start of the shift from concern for cultural differences and human rights of immigrants to
assimilation and integration.
Moving forward, I will use the words ‘integration’ and ‘assimilation’ repeatedly. In this
paper, I interpret integration and assimilation as one in the same. Although by definition they are
different, the policies and practices concerning integration, which will be later discussed in
Chapter Two, contain elements of both terms. Brendan O’Leary, author of Right-sizing the State:
The Politics of Moving Borders, defines assimilation as a process that “seeks to eliminate public
and private differences between people’s cultures...through fusion or acculturation” (34).
According to O’Leary, integration “stops at the public domain permitting private cultures to be
maintained” (34). Although the integration discourse in Denmark was largely public, policies
such as mother tongue teaching – which will also be discussed later – do interfere with
immigrants on a private sphere. By discontinuing the teaching of an immigrant’s native language
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on the stance that Danish should be spoken in the home, the goal is not just integration, but
assimilation. Ultimately, the policies set forth were not just about active participation and self
support, but also about complete cultural adoption.
By the mid-1990s, immigration and integration in particular were salient within the
political sphere. In 1999, the Social Democratic government introduced an ‘integration law’.
This law aimed to “contribute to the newly arrived foreigner’s possibility for participating on an
equal footing with other citizens (“borgere”) in the political, economic, work-related, social,
religious and cultural life of society’; to induce economic self-reliance and to provide the
‘individual foreigner [with] and understanding of the fundamental values and norms of the
Danish society” (Integration Law, article 1, qtd. in Mouritsen and Olsen 694–695). More
humanitarian aims, such as “ensuring equal rights and opportunities and promoting a society of
mutual respect, were deliberately excluded from the law” (Mouritsen and Olsen 695). The 1999
integration law also included the following dictates:
•

Mandatory three-year integration programs in order to obtain permanent residency

•

Family reunification eligibility only available to people with permanent residency status
were eligible to apply for family-reunification of relatives

•

Lower ‘introduction benefit’ for refugees

•

Possible of repatriation of welfare-dependent and non-permanent residents

•

Tougher demands on refugees (including a duty to remain in a designated municipality
for the first three years in Denmark) to make them whole persons. (Mouritsen and Olsen
695)
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In its “Concluding Observations” address to Denmark in 2000, The Human Rights
Committee found issue with Denmark’s enforcement of Articles 3 and 26 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The Committee noted the following:
•

The Committee is concerned about reports of discrimination against ethnic minorities.
The Committee recommends that measures be taken to prevent such discrimination (3).

•

The Committee notes that asylum-seekers in Denmark are often restricted or discouraged
from choosing a place of residence in specific municipalities or from moving from one
municipality to another. Denmark should ensure that any such measures are applied in
strict compliance with article 12 of the Covenant (4).

•

[As per Article 13 of the ICCPR], the Committee notes that asylum-seekers are entitled to
have the assistance of legal counsel. The state party should provide information as to the
stages of the application procedures at which legal assistance may be had, and whether
the assistance is free of charge at all stages for those who cannot afford it (4).

These dictates also violated Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
states, “everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each
state” (“United Nations. General Assembly”). Altogether, these policies reversed the 1983
immigration law, and also marked the beginning of a series of immigration laws that were to
come in the immediate years (Mouritsen and Olsen 695). The demand that refugees stay in a
designated municipality for three years, as part of an effort to make them “whole persons”
(Mouritsen and Olsen 695), is not only restrictive but also repressive.
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Far-Right Populism in Denmark
Right-wing populism has long existed in Denmark. In fact, the country became famous
for having the strongest right-wing populist party in the continent in the early 1970s. This party
was the Progress Party, which came to power in 1973 – the same year as the oil crisis. Notably,
the emergence of “guest workers” in the 1960s did not create an uproar about immigration
(Rydgren 474). This was therefore a non-issue in the party’s political policy. Though far right,
the Progress Party was largely a “tax-populist, anti-bureaucracy, protest party” (Rydgren 474).
Denmark’s first far-right party was the Danish People’s Party (DPP), which was founded in 1995
as a breakaway from the Danish Progress Party (Rydgren 480).
Far-right parties rose in popularity because of the deep division in sentiments concerning
membership in the European Union (EU), along with a “significant distrust” of and alienation
from politicians and government institutions in general. These attitudes stemmed from a deep
disappointment with the conservative government’s rule and their handling of the country’s new
taxation policies (Moore 359). The burden of taxes, rising levels of unemployment and shifting
employment trends gave rise to increased economic inequality, insecurity and unfavorable
attitudes towards immigrants. These factors “produced a deterioration of class and political party
identification, and opened the door even further to the far right” (Moore 359).
It is worth noting that immigration was not the DPP’s initial platform for emerging on the
political sphere. Rather, its platform was the opposition to taxation and the increasingly high
rates of taxation in the welfare state (Moore 357). Increased immigration simply furthered
citizens’ mistrust of the government and led the Danes to support their more radically right and
anti-establishment parties (Kestilä and Söderlund qtd. in Moore 358). Following the DPP’s
significant rise in popularity, the party maintained its position by bringing immigration issues to
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the forefront, and then by keeping these issues on top of electoral agendas, in order to further
influence new “rightward drift” of Danish politics. Central to the DPP’s message was the point
that immigration was a threat to Danish culture, as illustrated in the following message:
Denmark is not a country of immigration, and has never been one. We cannot
therefore accept a multiethnic transformation of the country. Denmark is a
country of Danes, and its citizens should be granted the opportunity to live in a
safe community founded on the rule of law which is evolving in line with Danish
culture...The Danish People’s Party is in favour of cultural cooperation with other
countries, but we are against giving other cultures, building on completely
different values and norms than ours, leverage in Denmark. The way of life we
have chosen in Denmark is outstanding. It is conditioned by our culture, and in a
small country like ours it cannot survive if we permit mass immigration of foreign
religions and foreign cultures. A multicultural society is a society without
coherence and unity, and, consequently, existing multicultural societies over the
globe are characterized by a lack of solidarity and often by open conflict, as well.
There are no good reasons to assume that Denmark would escape the destiny of
other multicultural societies if we let ourselves under the sway of foreign cultures
(Den Danske Foreing qtd. in Rydgren 484).
As cheap immigrant labor continued to be replaced by a sharp increase in asylum seeking
refugees, the rising anti-immigration sentiment in Denmark increased, with the formation of
organizations such as the Committee against the Refugee Law, founded in 1984 (and considered
the first anti-immigration organization in Denmark) and the Danish Association, founded in
1987. The message of the Danish Association was very similar to the DPP’s. The DPP’s message
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concerned the desire to “secure Danish culture, language and mode of life in a world threatened
by chaos, violence and fanaticism...[while warning against] the disintegration of [Danish] culture
and popular unity, which is caused by an influx of people from overpopulated countries” (Den
Danske Forening, qtd. in Rydgren 481).
In reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Danish Association
claimed “the right of the peoples of Western Europe...to their own households and their own
resources, [noting] the fundamental principle that nobody has the right to force one’s way into
another country at the expense of the peoples of that country” (Den Danske Forening qtd. in
Rydgren 481). Going even further, the organization’s ideology was akin to that of the French farright wing party, Le Front National. In a firm display of its stance against immigration, the
organization was centered on the following ideology:
When a foreign culture is pressed on another country, there will be a shower of
sparks. Those who today are intruding [on] our country do not want to become
‘integrated’. They are too many. And experiences from other European countries,
which have had mass migration for a long time, show us what will happen:
disturbances, violence and conflicts (Den Danske Foreing qtd. in Rydgren 482).
The Danish Association’s message addressed their concerns about foreign cultures and
religions; of which, the most vilified was Islam. Focusing on Muslims in a further effort to
rationalize its stance against immigration, the Danish Association said, “The majority of the
immigrants have another view of life than we have. For most Muslims there is no equality for
women and people of other religions. And the supreme law is not the one that is stipulated by our
democratic institutions, but Allah’s law, the Koran. The order they will try to implement here –
when they are many enough” (Den Danske Forening qtd. in Rydgren 482).
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The concept of ‘cultural anxiety’ (Grillo qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2311) contextualizes
why foreigners (particularly Muslims) may be perceived as threats (Rytter and Pedersen 2311).
“Cultural anxiety is directed at external transgressors2…or local ‘enemies within’, such as the
immigrant population, which personifies the disturbing forces of globalization, transformation
and change” (Rytter and Pedersen 2311–2312). Most noticeable in the public and political
discourse, this concept was heavily articulated and promoted by the DPP (Rytter and Pedersen
2311) as another component of their anti-immigration rhetoric.
The subsequent growth in public anti-immigration sentiment was certainly a factor in the
DPP’s win of the 2001 general election, which was dubbed the immigration election. With a
clear stance on immigrants, it was not surprising that the new ruling party would strongly
espouse its liberal-conservative values, which would ultimately help to usher in policies and
practices aimed at tightening immigration. In a series of steadily increasing conditions and
regulations, which will be discussed in Chapter Two, the Danish populous witnessed a seismic
shift in the Danish integration and immigration policy, with added constraints on access to
permanent residency or Danish citizenship, with added stringency for Muslim immigrants.
Overall, the pattern of Danish resistance to varying cultures and religions reflected
something that has been deeply embedded in their history. On the one hand, as a contracted state,
there was a need for security, which was in the comfort of having something “distinctly Danish”
to maintain the spirit of the nation. However, the framing of immigrants as threats and their
immediate association with violence, social unrest and the loss of social and cultural cohesion
also led to immigrants being portrayed as the cause of destabilization in an otherwise stable state.
The point is there is no true stability in a recently contracted state. The country’s sense of
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Rytter and Pedersen define “external transgressors” as the international economy, the European Union (EU), the
Human Rights Charter or the United Nations (2311–2312).	
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national identity needed to be rebuilt and restored at that time. However, by portraying
immigrants as risks, it was easier to associate immigrants with destabilization and destruction,
and blame them for the country’s socio-economic problems – even though the Danish nation was
anything but ideal.
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CHAPTER 2
Citizenship Policies: Creating ‘Good Citizens’
“The more alike we are, the easier it is to sustain the idea of equality. To be equal in Danish
society, thus tend[s] to imply to be similar”
(Johncke 2007 and Hervik 1999 qtd. in Jensen et al. 5)

Denmark’s accolades for its system of government and enforcement of human rights
internationally have not dispelled the fact that immigration is still a challenge for the state.
Despite the religious shifts to the formerly Christian state over the years, the Grudtvigian
ideology remained central to the Danish identity. With its emphasis on Danish poetry, history
and culture, Grundtvigism became embedded into the fiber of the nation’s being – thus
informing its national identity. Grudtvigian teaching was not just about spirituality, but also
about nationality – which very strongly influenced Danish customs. This notion of “Danishness”
is therefore quite impactful, especially on issues relating to assimilation and acculturation; and
they could explain the immigration issues present for Muslims, as well as the social perceptions
of Muslim minorities and whether or not they fit the definition of a “good citizen.” Considering
these factors as a conceptual foundation for understanding the immigration and integration
policies in Denmark, this chapter will examine how they have been modified to affect
immigrants and cultural minorities.

Integration as Assimilation: The Creation of the ‘Good Citizen’
From Chapter One, we know that the 1980s marked the start of integration becoming a
significant political issue – leading to the creation of a 1983 immigration law – which was then
effectively reversed with the 1999 immigration law. The new law also marked the start of further
systematic changes in Denmark’s immigration and integration policies. The Danish immigration
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law comprised of two main features: the Aliens Act and the Integration Act. “The Aliens Act
addressed foreigners’ legal status in Denmark concerning [circumstances such as]...entry and
residence permits (temporary and permanent). The Integration Act concerned the actual process
of integration [for]…refugees and family reunification of refugees and immigrants from its
inception until 2010 – after which further changes came into effect (Jensen et al. 3).
Analysts from the Danish Center for Social Research (SFI) identified the objective of the
Integration Act as, “to ensure that newly arrived foreigners are given the possibility of using their
abilities and resources to become involved as contributing citizens on equal footing with other
citizens of Danish society” (Jensen et al. 4). This, the researchers say, must be done via an
“effort of integration” (Jensen et al. 4). One of the objectives listed under the Integration Act
pertains to the imparting of “the fundamental values and norms of the Danish society”
(Integration Act qtd. in Jensen et al.). The act also emphasized the importance of “making newly
arrived foreigners self-supporting as quickly as possible through employment” (Jensen, et al. 4)
as well as ensuring that immigrants can function in the political, economic, social and religious
spheres “on an equal footing with other citizens” (Jensen et al. 4). Based on these objectives,
researchers from SFI concluded, “The notion of equality is central to the Integration Act and in
the integration policy as such. However, the concept of equality is closely related to a perception
that equality requires a certain degree of sameness…” thus making the law somewhat
contradictory (Jensen et al.5). This analysis explains why I define integration and assimilation,
in the Danish, context as one in the same.
Despite the recommendations from the Human Rights Committee in 2000, the criteria for
gaining access to citizenship was further tightened in 2002, 2004, 2005 and 2008 (Mouritsen and
Olsen 699). In 2002, the government implemented what was recognized as the strictest rule in
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the world at the time (Schmidt qtd. in Fernandez and Jensen 1140). The government reintroduced
the lower ‘introduction benefit’ (first presented in the 1999 immigration law) for new immigrants
entering the program as well as “lower ‘start help’ payments for those unemployed (including
Danish citizens) who had not spent seven of the previous eight years in Denmark” (Mouritsen
and Olsen 698). In 2005, ‘integration contracts’, which were to be signed by immigrants, were
also introduced. These contracts “specified increased obligations (attending language school,
active job seeking) as conditions for financial support...” (Mouritsen and Olsen 698). Later, “the
legal right to family reunification was withdrawn and a controversial twenty-four year rule
(requiring both the Danish-resident spouse and the new immigrant to be at least twenty-four
years old for residency to be granted) in order to prevent forced (and arranged marriages) and to
reduce the number of immigrants from lower socioeconomic backgrounds” (Mouritsen and
Olsen 698).
Going even further, the criteria for gaining access to citizenship also included the following:
•

Residence requirement of nine years

•

A loyalty affirmation

•

A written citizenship test without publicized questions that can be practiced beforehand

•

A stiff language requirement (minimum grade D (ECTS) in level 3 Danish test

•

Tough restrictions and waiting periods in case of previous welfare dependency, public
debts or criminal offenses. (Mouritsen and Olsen, 699)
In keeping with the Danish focus on integration and assimilation, the required citizenship

test included questions that tested immigrants’ knowledge of Danish national culture by asking
trivia questions related to sports, such as football championships. The test included questions on
high culture (testing knowledge of painters and authors) and early national history (e.g., the
introduction of Christianity in Denmark). The language test also exceeded the typical
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‘functional’ competence needed for the labor market and political participation and instead tested
for a level of language competence that “many non-Western immigrants, especially the lower
educated, [would] not be able to reach” (Mouritsen and Olsen 700). Finally, in what Mouritsen
and Olsen describe as a conspicuous act, Denmark rejected dual citizenship, but provided
“special fast-track naturalization procedures for ‘culturally close’ applicants from Nordic
countries and northern Germany” (Mouritsen and Olsen 700).
None of these changes amounted to those implemented in the amendment of the
Integration Law in 2010. One added stipulation was that ‘successful integration’ was a condition
for obtaining a permanent residence permit (Jensen et al. 5). Although the term ‘successful
integration’ was neither used nor defined in the Integration Act, researchers from the SFI assert
that the wording of the act suggests that ‘successful integration’ is “apparently measured by
educational performance, fast acquisition of Danish language skills, integration into the labourmarket, economic self-reliance and active participation in society” (Jensen et al. 6).
In 2010, “the rules on access to (and forfeit of) permanent residency” were further
tightened, with “the introduction of a required sustained course in Danish society, culture and
history” (Mouritsen and Olsen 700). In the same year, the minimum required years for residence
before being eligible for permanent residence was reduced from seven years to four years;
however a point system for immigrants was subsequently introduced (Mouritsen and Olsen 700).
This point system allowed for immigrants to earn permanent residence only if they met the
increased requirements of “labor market activity and language scores, with points added for
active citizenship (i.e., voluntary work in schools and local associations)” (Mouritsen and Olsen
700).
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According to Mouritsen and Olsen, the citizenship policies (especially those outlined in
the revamped 2010 Integration Law) were designed to “pressure or motivate immigrants into
becoming model citizens before they achieve actual citizen status (naturalization) and even
before they earn the right to permanent residence” (698). Essentially, not only were the policies
designed to force integration/assimilation, but also to serve as “civic-screening and exclusion
devices” such that some people could not, and would not, become members of the Danish
society (Mouritsen and Olsen 698). For immigrants, being a model Danish citizen entailed being
self supporting, having or acquiring knowledge of Danish values, and also participating in
society – all for their own benefit (Mouritsen and Olsen 695). These requirements revealed who
could and could not meet the demands, resulting in a line being drawn between ‘the good’ and
‘the bad’ foreigners (Jensen et al. 6).
With the plethora of changes in the Danish immigration policy, a new type of societal
membership emerged, described as a “two-tier membership” (Mouritsen and Olsen 700).
Effectively, either one was a societal ‘citizen’ or a full citizen. In “Denmark Between Liberalism
and Nationalism,” Mouritsen and Olsen define societal ‘citizenship’ as being made available for
those who can “integrate well in terms of work, active participation, and significant cultural
knowledge and adaptation” (700). They define full citizenship as having “a Danish passport,
including rights to fully participate politically, move freely across EU and other borders, and
receive social transfers without implications for one’s rights to stay” (700). The rights, Mouritsen
and Olsen say, “remain privileges for an even more select inner circle” (700).
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The Danish Philosophy of Integration
Though the measures implemented by the Danish government may seem harsh, they
serve as stark reminders of Danish history and the principles upon which Danish nationalism was
built. Besides homogeneity, embedded in the cultural fiber of Denmark are the remnants of
Christian, Lutheran and Grundtvigian principles. The four other elements that are arguably some
of the driving forces behind the Danish philosophy of integration are: Christianity, emphasis on
the Danish language, pride in the welfare society and Lutheranism.
Although Denmark is considered a secular state, the role of religion in society remains
significant. According to the Constitutional Act of Denmark (The Danish Constitution, section
4), the Evangelical Lutheran Church, also known as the People’s Church (Folkekirken), is the
established church of Denmark (Rytter and Pedersen 2311; Mouritsen and Olsen 696). Known as
the state’s church since its integration into the state during the years of the protestant
reformation, the church still enjoys a “privileged position in cultural life” (Mouritsen and Olsen
696), as it is “governed and financed by the state, from the Ministry of Ecclesiastical
Affairs” (Rytter and Pedersen 2311). “Protestantism still tends to play a significant role in
various settings, from the annual ritual opening of parliament (Folketinget), to the Queen’s New
Year’s speech and [most importantly] the state school (folkeskole) curriculum” (Rytter and
Pedersen 2311). Moreover, as of April 2015, the national website of Denmark still lists its
national religion as 90% Protestant (“Facts and Statistics”).
Given Denmark’s history with language (as propagated by Grundtvig), “mastery and
public (or even private) use of the Danish language remains a strong parameter of national
belonging both socially and legally, over the ‘functional’ considerations of both public
communication and labor market flexibility” (Mouritsen and Olsen 696). Thirdly, “the smallness,
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cultural homogeneity and tight-knit ‘cosiness’ of Danish society” stemming back to the loss of
the war with Germany, along with the “homogenizing process through schools and monopoly
television” are still part of the larger discourse on “national cohesion, the valuation of sameness
and the mistrust of cultural pluralism...” (Mouritsen and Olsen 696–697).
The fourth thing to note is the “pride in the welfare society (not state)” in which solidarity
is conditioned on working and paying taxes, provided that one is not “sick, handicapped, retired
or temporarily unemployed” (Mouritsen and Olsen 697). Lastly, “Lutheranism remains
significant” (Mouritsen and Olsen 697). The Grundtvigian-Lutheran ideology not only
“challenges citizens to struggle for all that you hold dear” (Richardt qtd. in Mouritsen and Olsen
697), but also teaches them to “tolerate, with both goodwill and confrontation, the belief of
others” (Mouritsen and Olsen 697). These policies became integral to the government’s approach
to immigration and integration policies. For Muslims, this was particularly problematic. Despite
the decline in traditional religiosity, discourses of ‘cultural Christianity’ and ‘Lutheran
individualism’ have recycled some of the elements above in a manner which places Islam in an
unfavorable light (Mouritsen and Olsen, 697), thus presenting further immigration and
integration problems for Muslim immigrants and minorities, respectively.

Revisiting the Historic Danish Rescue of Jews During the Holocaust
The problems currently present for the Muslim minority are not unlike those experienced
by Jews who had previously settled in Denmark in the 1930s. Close examination of the climate
in Denmark at the time reveals stark similarities in the domestic experiences of Jews then and
Muslims today. The following analysis reveals that like Muslims, Jews were stereotyped, they
faced criticism because of their religious beliefs, they were subjected to strict immigration
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restrictions, and were more likely to be accepted if they were assimilated (i.e., they spoke
Danish, dressed like Danes and conformed to socio-cultural norms). The analysis shows the
depth to which Danish culture has influenced its policies and practices. This does not mean
culture is the only influencing factor, but it is certainly a significant one.
Despite the popular representations of the brighter side of Danish history – which
includes the story of the rescue and safe smuggling of Danish Jews into Sweden, as protection
from Nazi forces during the Holocaust – a dark undertone also existed within the Danish model
of humanism towards Jews, particularly Jewish refugees in the 1930s. Before the 1940 German
occupation of Denmark, Danish policies towards Jewish immigrants were not very different from
those of other European countries at the time. Entrance visas were “strictly limited,” and some
German Jewish refugees were stopped at the border and “sent home to their deaths” (Buckser 2).
Though these instances were reduced during the German occupation, they still happened. As
case in point, 21 stateless Jewish refugees were expelled to Germany between 1940 and 1943.
They were neither ordered nor demanded by German occupiers, but were nonetheless sent to
their deaths after living in Denmark for a number of years (Vilhjálmsson and Blüdnikow,
“Rescue, Expulsion, and Collaboration”). Although there are no clear details as to why this was
done, it is evident that anti-Semitism was very much alive in Denmark.
Another thing to note is that for three years (1940–1943), Denmark put up with the
German occupation based on something known as the negotiations policy or Forhandlingspolitik
(Voorhis, 173). This resulted in Denmark regarded as Germany’s Musterprotektortat (model
protectorate) or ‘Hitler’s Canary,’ as Winston Churchill dubbed it (Friedman 318). There were
very minimal signs of resistance on the part of the Danish people, as this policy reduced the
number of Danish casualties (Voorhis 173). Further examination of the reasons behind the
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Danish rescue of Jews incites speculation on Danish humanitarianism as it relates to their
motivation for assisting Jews, especially when there were indications of anti-Semitic sentiments
within the country.
There were notably high levels of assimilation for Jews living in Denmark from the
1600s. Danish Jews at the time spoke Danish, they dressed like other Danes, and they
participated actively in the social and cultural life of the nation (Buckser 9). Danish Jews also
enjoyed full civil rights since 1814. However, their assimilation meant that – unlike today’s
Muslims – Danish Jews had a stronger identification with larger Danish culture and were (to
some extent) accepted as such.
During the state’s economic disaster in 1813, anti-Semitic sentiments became more
apparent as Jews were considered responsible for the nation’s bankruptcy, and were portrayed in
the media as “parasitic and alien to the Danish nation” (Wagner 154). Although an 1814 law
against racial and religious discrimination protected these immigrants, there was still opposition
to the official acceptance of Jews into Danish society. At the assemblies of the Estate in the
1830s and 1840s, there were strong opinions against furthering the rights of Jews on a
“combination of ethic[al] and religious grounds [such as the notion that]...Jews could never
become Danes, because the core of being Danish was Christianity and the essence [of] being
Jewish was to belong to that nation alien to the Danish people” (Wagner 154).
After the re-stabilization of the Danish economy and the successful full emancipation of
Jews in 1848–49, due to activism (Wagner 154), there were post-emancipation conflicts that led
to Jews being associated with “individualistic hedonism, materialistic capitalism, radical
skepticism and anticlerical liberalism,” which was aimed at destroying the “organically grown
Christian state” (Wagner 156). This statement, made by a Bishop named Hans Lassen
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Martensen, was in reference to the “assimilated and emancipated Jewry,” who he felt were the
“primary force undermining the concept of the Christian nation state” (Wagner 155). The
ongoing debate surrounding Jewish integration continued – reaching a critical level in the 1870s.
Described as the “critical transition period” (Wagner 156), there was now a “bridge between
anti-emancipationist concepts of the first half of the nineteenth century and the rearticulation of
anti-Jewish stereotyping since the late nineteenth century” (Wagner 156–157).
Years later, between 1901 and 1917, a new wave of immigrants from Russia and other
Eastern European countries immigrated to the county. These Jews, on the other hand, spoke
Yiddish and had trouble mastering the Danish language; their mode of dress differed from
Danish styles; their Jewish practice was more orthodox than the ‘reform-influenced Danish
Jews’, they had little to no income; and, overall, they were easily distinguishable3 (qtd. in
Buckser 9–10). “Since the immigrants had to walk to services on the Sabbath, they soon formed
a small immigrant slum in the cramped streets surrounding the synagogue. This new group was
very visible, and its image soon came to dominate public perceptions of Jews in Denmark” (9).
From there, caricatures of Jews in Danish newspapers began to appear, portraying Jews as
“...dark, bearded men in Eastern European dress,” thus upsetting native Jews (Buckser 9). In
response to the caricatures, several comments were made, such as, “[they] used to see us as
Danes of Mosaic faith, but now they look at us as Jews!” (Blum qtd. in Buckser 10).
Given the aforementioned examples, it is therefore quite plausible that the need to
safeguard the interest of the Danish state was the primary driver in the resistance to the Nazi
invasion. After all, Denmark was willing to make concessions with the Germans for three years,
while she was occupied by the Nazis to “keep her own parliamentary system, the monarchy, and
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  Buckser notes that this description of the immigrants is based primarily on Pinches Weiner, Fra polskjode til dansk
(Copenhagen: Hasselbach, 1965); Bludnikow, Immigranter; Melchior, A Rabbi Remembers; Blum, Dansk og/eller
Jode; Benjamin Balslev, De Danske Joders Historie (Copenhagen: Lohse, 1932); and Bamberger, Viking Jews. 	
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a degree of constitutional liberty...This ability to maintain her independence and prevent a
German or Nazi take-over resulted partly from the Danish government’s policy of cooperation
and non-resistance” (Voorhis 173). Of course, there were other factors, such as the strength of
the German military. Nonetheless, up until this point, the only Danish resistance to the German
occupation pertained to issues which would alter the political structure of Denmark, such as
blocking the increasing push from Germans for Danish support of the economic development of
German-held areas in the Soviet Union, blocking the German push for a Quisling-type
government (Voorhis 176). If there was not a threat to the Danish way of life and belief system,
there may have been no famous historical WWII achievement of which to speak.
Overall, the newer integration/assimilation requirements appeared to be more extensive
and stringent, but their intent was the same – to achieve the greatest level of
assimilation/integration and to uphold and protect the Danish national culture. What is different,
however, is the context through which the policies were created, and the way the minority
reacted to them. What is clear is that there was a focus on maintaining a culturally homogeneous
society by controlling who is best positioned to receive permanent residence or citizenship, based
on “cultural closeness.” This exclusivity transcends nationalism and extends to xenophobia.
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CHAPTER 3
The Intersection Between Immigration, Integration and Security

2001 is an important year in Danish history for several reasons: 2001 was the year of the
September 11 (9/11) attacks against the United States, and it marked the first of a 10-year rule of
Denmark by the far-right wing political party, DPP. The DPP succeeded in the state elections,
two months after the 9/11 attacks, which was a critical event that sent shockwaves through the
American nation, and other parts of the world. In Denmark, 9/11 aided the DPP’s push for more
stringent immigration and integration policies. What followed is what I call the 9/11 effect,
which was a rise in Islamophobia, and a subsequent immigration policy that was overall
restrictive but also slightly more disadvantageous to Muslim immigrants, who were seen as
possible threats to the country.
The 9/11 attacks heightened the already salient debate on immigration, while also
merging these issues with “concerns of national security and the potential threat of Muslims both
inside and outside of Denmark” (Olwig and Paerregaard, qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2306). The
measures employed to tackle both the immigration and security concerns became known as the
‘security/integration response’. These actions ushered in a period that Mikkel Rytter and
Marianne Holm Pedersen call “a decade of suspicion,” especially towards Muslims who became
cast as “the usual suspects” in society (Rytter and Pedersen 2303).
This chapter discusses Rytter and Pedersen’s suggestion that the policies and practices
enforced against Muslim immigrants are not just because of Denmark’s historical, political and
cultural processes towards immigration and integration. Instead, they assert that these factors
merged with 9/11 as a global factor and joined with the European adoption of a
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security/integration response, subsequently producing what they refer to as a “distinctly ‘Danish’
version of a much broader phenomenon” (2309).

Understanding Securitization
9/11 signaled the beginning of changes in security policies, hence ushering a series of
new laws and policies, as well as “altering notions of identity, belonging and day to day relations
between majorities and minorities in various countries around the world” (Rytter and Pedersen
2305). European countries embarked on a process known as ‘securitization’, which is defined as
“the process where something (a referent object) is deemed threatened and security actions are
taken in its defense” (Lausten and Wæver, qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2305). Through
securitization, European countries also introduced “far-reaching pre-emptive policies and
legislation to protect the states and citizens against “religiously motivated terrorism” (Rytter and
Pedersen 2305).
After 9/11, there was a noticeable shift in the perception and conceptualization of ethnic
and religious minorities in Denmark (Rytter and Pedersen 2306). This shift was more apparent
for Muslims. An “essentialist understanding” of Islam emerged, highlighting Muslim militant
groups, while casting a shadow on the religious faith and practices of the world’s Muslims. For
many politicians, commentators and European citizens, Islam became seen as being “opposed to
democracy, equal rights and freedom of speech” (Cesari qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2303) and
Muslims were seen as potential internal enemies because of their difference in ideology. This
resulted in debates and politics regarding Muslim immigrants as needing new and heightened
security dimensions.
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As part of the ‘security’ component of the security/integration response, a Ministry of
Integration was created “in order to deal with the urgent political questions concerning
immigrants and refugees in Danish society” (Olwig and Paerregaad, qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen
2307). There was “increased control, surveillance and regulation of Muslim immigrant families
already living in Denmark” (Rytter and Pedersen 2307). There were also increased barriers to
entry into Denmark, as the criteria for being granted permanent residency as a refugee were
changed, resulting in a plummet in accepted refugees to Denmark from 5,211 in 2001 to 233 in
2007 (Rytter and Pedersen 2307).

Understanding Integration
Following the adoption and implementation of securitization initiatives, the Danish
government began revisiting its integration policies and implementing several changes, some of
which were already discussed in the “Integration as Assimilation” section of Chapter Two.
Another major change, not yet discussed, was the abolition of mother tongue teaching in 2002,
which “up until that point, had been obligatory and was provided to children with an immigrant
background” (Rytter and Pedersen 2308). Despite international research findings stating that
“bilingual students perform better in education if they are fluent in both Danish and their native
language…the argument was that children – in the name of integration – should speak Danish at
home” (Holmen qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2308). “Subsidies paid to immigrant associations
were [also] significantly reduced” (Rytter and Pedersen 2308).
“While immigrant, cultural and religious associations had formally been encouraged as a
means of enhanced engagement in civil society in the wake of 9/1,1 these groups were monitored
and controlled and, to a large extent, regarded as suspect” (Rytter and Pedersen 2308).
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According to Rytter and Pedersen, “while [the Danish response to] the war on terror was, at first,
an immediate reaction to an extreme situation, it later became normalized as an obvious aspect of
the resort and jurisdiction of the nation state” (Andersen qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2308).
Essentially, “the reconstruction of Muslim immigrants as a potential enemy within became an
almost permanent, naturalized condition” (Rytter and Pedersen 2309).
This transformation of the Muslim image into being a threat to the Danish nation and its
values was most evident in Denmark’s change in its citizenship policies; which made the
possibility of Muslim immigrants being part of Danish society far more difficult. The citizenship
policies required immigrant applicants to “pass a test on Danish history, culture and society”...as
well as sign a “declaration in which they swear allegiance and loyalty to Denmark and Danish
society, and declare their willingness to observe and respect the national laws” (Rytter and
Pederson 2308). “Denmark also started to select the refugees making up its United Nations (UN)
quota on the basis of so-called ‘integration potential’. In practice, this meant that more Christian
refugees were granted residency at the expense of refugees with a Muslim background” (Whyte
qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2307).

Immigration, Securitization and Integration
The rapid decrease in the number of accepted refugees to Denmark after 9/11 was due in
large part to the Aliens Act which was enacted in 2002, as part of an agreement between the
Danish government and the DPP. The Aliens Act facilitated the abolition of the de facto concept,
which was replaced by the protection status or status B concept, which limited Denmark’s role in
receiving immigrants only to its obligatory human rights convention requirements (Kjær 255).
In what was an unambiguous departure from its long history of having more favorable policies
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towards refugees and asylum seekers, this change was in keeping with the desire to reduce the
number of foreigners entering Denmark, and to implement stricter requirements in order to help
facilitate faster integration.
The de facto concept was part of the 1983 immigration law. Its goal was to protect people
who fell outside of the definition of “refugee,”4 as stipulated by the 1951 Refugee Convention
(Kjær). In addition to ‘traditional’ refugees, who fled their native countries because of the threat
of persecution or lack of protection, the Danish de facto concept also applied to migrants who
fled their country to avoid active war service “republic refugees,”5 and migrants whose cases
provided insufficient evidence to support their claims for applying for citizenship. This particular
provision was justified using the “general acknowledged principle of international asylum law
relating to benefit of the doubt” (Kjær 255). The change meant that asylum seekers and refugee
applicants would be assessed based on international covenants. The status B concept guarantees
protection to those who are protected under the 1951 Convention. It also protects persons who
risk ‘being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,’ as well as
“foreigners risking the death penalty,” which is included in the sixth article of European
Convention of Human Rights (Kjær 256).
Denmark’s amended refugee and asylum changes were most harmful to asylum seekers
from Afghanistan and Iran. Kim Kjær, Senior Research Fellow at the Danish Institute for Human
Rights, asserts that Danish administrative initiatives were launched at Afghan and Iranian asylum
seekers when, for a brief period of time, Danish officials decided to “suspend the processing of
applications for asylum from Afghan nationals” (Kjær 268). This occurred despite their
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“When the provision on de facto status was introduced in The 1983 Act, the relevant persons received a proper
legal claim to reside as refugees in Denmark as ‘de facto refugees’ on more or less the same terms as convention[al] 	
  
refugees” (Kjær 256).	
  
5
These were ‘refugees’ “from the former eastern bloc countries who, if they returned, risked violent reprisals merely
because they had stayed for a long period and/or applied for asylum in a Western country” (Kjær 256).	
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recognition as refugees, in order to “procure new updated background information on the
situation in the country” (Kjær 268). According to Kjær, the hope was that the situation in
Afghanistan would improve, reducing the number of asylum seeker applications (268).
Whatever the reasons, it is quite possible that Denmark’s actions were in violation of
Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states “everyone has the right to
seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution” (“United Nations. General
Assembly”). As a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention, Denmark is obligated to uphold the
duties and principles set forth within the Convention. Although the state may reject an asylum
application, the choice to halt the processing of applications from a distinct region can also be
seen as a violation of Article 3, Section 4 of the	
  Council Resolution of 20 June 1995 on
Minimum Guarantees for Asylum Procedures. More specifically, it could be said that Denmark’s
actions violated the stipulation that “[d]ecisions will be taken independently in the sense that all
asylum applications will be examined and decided upon individually, objectively and
impartially” (“Council Resolution of June 20 1995”). The act of suspending the asylum
applicants of Afghan immigrants denied them the right to an impartial and objective
examination, as well as their right to seek asylum as stated by the Council Resolution and
UDHR, respectively.

When History, Politics and Culture Collide: The Danish Cartoon Controversy
The image of Islam “as a dangerous and threatening religion…has been a concern that
has, in various ways, been part of European history and identity since the expansion of the
Ottoman Empire” (Said qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2309). One notable instance of an Islamic
uprising is what was called the Rushdie affair in 1989, “which mobilized a visible Muslim public
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in Europe” (Rytter and Pedersen 2309)…[and] created a new enemy of European values, identity
and sovereignty, as the threat of communism was succeeded by the threat of Islamism” (Hervik;
Werbner, qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2309).
According to Rytter and Pedersen, Denmark had its own ‘Rushdie affair’ with its cartoon
controversy in 2005–06 (and again in 2008), which led to a mobilization of Muslims on an
“unprecedented scale” (2309–2310).6 The Cartoon Controversy concerned the printing of twelve
caricatures of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad, along with an editorial that “instructed Muslims
to accept ‘insults, mockery and ridicule’ as necessary aspects of contemporary democracy and
freedom of speech” in Jyllands-Posten, the country’s largest newspaper (Hervik; Klausen;
Lindekilde, Mouritsen and Zapata-Barrero qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2309–2310).

Rage Ignited: The Muslim Response to the Cartoon Controversy
Following the release of the cartoons, there was a large outcry from members of the
Muslim community, and a push to bring attention to the issue. This uproar was so large, in fact,
that the Muslim reaction to the cartoon controversy marked the first time since the Thirty Years
War that a conflict with religious connotations had such an impact in Danish society (Rudling
76). Members of the Danish community implemented many initiatives, such as traveling to the
Middle East to bring international attention to the case and to gather Muslim
Imams/representatives (Rytter and Pedersen 2310).
A primary catalyst for the immense Muslim response was Prime Minister Fogh
Rasmussen’s refusal to meet with eleven ambassadors from Muslim countries who wanted to
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In “Denmark as the Big Satan,” Per Anders Rudling outlines the degree of outrage in the Muslim community. He
notes, “The decision to publish these cartoons outraged some high-profile Islamists within Denmark. 3,500
Muslims protested on the streets of Copenhagen against the cartoons. A 17-year old Muslim boy was [also] arrested
for attempting to kill one of the cartoonists” (77).	
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discuss “what they considered to be an anti-Islamic campaign” (Rudling 77). The Danish Prime
Minister and the Danish government also refused to censor the media or compel them to portray
Muslims in a more positive light on the grounds that the cartoons were being portrayed as
expressions of freedom of speech” (Rudling 73–74). In his official response to the Muslim
protesters, Prime Minister Rasmussen said, “the freedom of expression has a wide scope and the
Danish government has no means of influencing the press. However, Danish legislation prohibits
acts or expressions of a blasphemous or discriminatory nature” (Larsen and Seidenfaden qtd. in
Hervik 60).
For many Muslim protestors, the cartoons were derogatory because they associated the
Prophet Muhammad with terrorism, thus implying that all Muslims are terrorists (“Questions and
Answers”). According to Rytter and Pedersen, the larger populous generally viewed the Muslim
response objections to the cartoons as “inappropriate; instead of being seen as expressions of
freedom of speech, their positions and protests were framed as threats to the freedom of speech
and Danish secular society” (2311). This boosted the outrage of Danish Muslims, resulting in
riots, which led to the deaths of 139 people (not including the deaths of the 146 killed in
Nigeria), over 800 people injured and over 10,000 unemployed because of political embargoes
and destroyed buildings, by torching and vandalism (Rudling 76).7
In further signs of protest, governments like those of Saudi Arabia and Syria, who are not
otherwise champions of religious freedom, sided with the Danish Muslim community by
supporting boycotts of Danish goods and also withdrawing their ambassadors from Copenhagen
(Kimmelman, “A Startling New Lesson in the Power of Imagery”). In solidarity with JyllandsPosten and in defense of free speech, European papers republished the cartoons in countries such
as in Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Hungary, New Zealand, Ukraine and Jordan.
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  The buildings destroyed include European consulates and embassies, Christian churches and fast food restaurants.	
  

Anderson 44

One also appeared in The Philadelphia Inquirer (Kimmelman, “A Startling New Lesson in the
Power of Imagery”). The images also “spread worldwide via the Web, exacerbating Muslim
outrage...” (Kimmelman, “A Startling New Lesson in the Power of Imagery”).
In an interview two years after the publication of the twelve images, Fleming Rose, one
of the cartoonists responsible for the drawing maintained that his drawings were not
discriminatory or racist, instead noting that the Muslim response was unjustified. While talking
to New York Times reporter Michael Kimmelman, Mr. Rose said:
It was not about mocking a minority but a religious figure, the Prophet, so it was
blasphemy, not racism. The idea of challenging religious authority led to liberal
democracy, whereas the singling out of minorities, as minorities, led to Nazism
and the persecution of the bourgeoisie in Russia. So this distinction is crucial to
understand. (Kimmelman, “Outrage at Cartoons Still Tests the Danes”)
Kimmelman, in another interview with Kurt Westergaard, a cartoonist responsible for
one of the drawings of the prophet Muhammad, asked him if he went too far with the drawing. In
response, Westergaard said, “Looking back, perhaps I should have made a cartoon that did not
use the yellow star.” Kimmelman then asked, “But then why Muhammad and not a star?” and
Westergaard replied, “Because millions of Jews died in camps wearing that star” (Kimmelman,
“Outrage at Cartoons Still Tests the Danes”).
After referencing Prime Minister Rasmussen’s speech, in which he cited Danish law as
prohibiting acts or expressions of a blasphemous or discriminatory nature (Larsen and
Seidenfaden qtd. in Hervik 60), one may question why there was no government intervention on
behalf of Muslims, on the grounds of blasphemy. Human Rights Watch (HRW) notes that
countries with blasphemy laws rarely enforce them, and in general these laws usually protect
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religions such as Christianity and Judaism. Noting the inconsistencies between offensive speech
that is criminalized (for Christians and Jews) and tolerated (for Muslims), HRW acknowledges
the existence of a “clearly discriminatory practice [that] raises legitimate questions about double
standards” (“Questions and Answers”).
According to Human Rights Watch, Mr. Rose and Mr. Westergaard were within their
rights of freedom of expression, since the cartoons are not considered “hate speech.” Hate
speech “constitutes imminent incitement to unlawful acts of discrimination, hostility or
violence” (“Questions and Answers”). In the case of Danish Muslims, “the main complaint
against the cartoons is that is that they offend Islam, not that they have inspired acts of violence,
criminal harassment or tangible discrimination against Danish or other Muslims” (“Questions
and Answers”). Human rights law states that, “[s]peech that targets a religion for disrespect, as
opposed to speech that targets believers for unlawful acts, is protected, however offensive it may
be” (“Questions and Answers”). Therefore, Muslims do not have the right, under international
human rights, law to “…censor the expression of others in the name of their own religious
freedom” (“Questions and Answers”).
Although the twelve cartoons are not legally considered hate speech, I suspect that the
images were nonetheless impactful and particularly offensive, not just because they made fun of
the prophet Muhammad, but also because its satire associated the prophet with violence and
terrorism (which, some may argue, implies that Muslims are also terrorists). It is also worth
considering that Denmark was cited for reports of discrimination against ethnic minorities in the
past.8 Furthermore, in a post-9/11 world, cartoons simply suggesting Islamic terrorism may have
(in the very least) resulted in increased suspicion, if not some discrimination against Muslims.
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  Denmark was cited by the Human Rights Committee in its “Consideration of Reports” to Denmark in 2000 (3).	
  

Anderson 46

The Social Definition of Muslim
The media is a significant factor worth considering while assessing the policies and
process that have influenced the way Muslim minorities are perceived and treated in Denmark.
Though the focus of my thesis is on the cultural elements that have contributed to the policies
and practices that have impacted immigration in Denmark, I cannot reduce these policies to one
single element. I must also acknowledge that there are numerous other elements and actors that
contribute to the formation of these policies, such as extreme right parties, grass roots
organizations, national government, transnational governments and the media (Huysmans 758).
Of these, the media is especially instrumental in the way Muslim minorities have been perceived
because of its extensive coverage of immigrants involved in riots in urban ghettos, which led to
“political renderings of these riots as manifestations of incivility,” and then fueled the perception
of immigrants as a dangerous class that poses a threat to a culture (Rey qtd. in Huysmans 763).
In Figure 1, Peter Hervik, a	
  Professor in Migration Studies in Center for the Study of at
Aalborg University in Denmark, applies Robert Entman’s (1993) model of frame analysis to this
incident. It represents common themes that emerged based on media coverage of the cartoon
controversy in 232 news articles (47). From his research, Hervik concludes that Islam has been
largely portrayed as a problem, and has been represented as a religion of violence and intolerance
(48). These factors are supposedly demonstrated in the Muslim minority's inability to uphold a
basic principle of Danish culture, freedom of speech, which is also a basic discourse of human
rights. Finally, the demonization of Muslims created a “them” and “us” and a “good” versus
“bad” distinction, as illustrated in figure 1.
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Fig.1, The Three Frames – A Struggle of News and Views

In response to the Cartoon Controversy and the overall treatment of Muslim minorities
post 9/11, Sune Skadegaard Thorsen adds to Hervik’s discussion on the prevailing perception
leads of Muslim minorities, by commenting on how the perceptions of Muslims in Denmark
have influenced the way they are treated. In this excerpt, a clear picture of the social climate in
Denmark during this time further emerges:
Islam is under attack in Denmark and has been for some time, especially after
September 11. Muslims have been prevented from building Mosques, from
making burial places, from wearing scarves and holding meetings. Muslims have
been pestered in the streets with words and with slaps. Muslim stores and clubs
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are vandalized. Muslims are kept under surveillance, and are being arrested and
are being portrayed in the press as uncivilized and ‘abnormal’, if not terrorists.
The cartoons were the last straw. Let us kick who are already lying down.
Islamophobia is raging. Muslims in Denmark must react; anything else would be
unnatural (qtd. in Hervik 50).
Because of the magnitude of the response from the Islamic community, “Muslims
became redefined as they went from being a minority in Denmark to becoming the local
representatives of a global religious community – that is, outsiders who may pose a threat to
Danish or Western values” (Kublitz, qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2310). Also, “the fundamental
structural differences between the Evangelic [sic] Lutheran Church and the Muslim communities
(and other religious minorities) are seldom addressed in public debates. This ‘blind spot’ in
relation to the constitution of Danish secularism tends to make Muslim activists susceptible to
being classified as politically illegitimate or as Islamist” (Jakobsen; Henkel qtd. in Rytter and
Pedersen 2311).
James Baldwin once said, “The most dangerous creation of any society is the man who
has nothing to lose.” The publication of the 12 caricatures of the prophet Muhammad was the
last straw for the Muslim community. The combination of stringent immigration policies,
heightened surveillance and monitoring of Muslims, and the offensive illustration of a religious
figure was all too much. Given the climate of the discourse against Muslims, it was only a matter
of time before there was a break and some form of resistance. No matter the form this resistance
took, it is clear that the Muslim vs. majority relations in Denmark was on the cusp of cataclysm.
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CHAPTER 4
The Impact of the Security/Integration Response
The everyday lives of Muslims in Denmark have long been disrupted by how they have
been portrayed, perceived and treated because of their faith and cultural difference. “Not
surprisingly, many Muslims in Denmark [have become] frustrated about being associated with
violence and terror because of their religious faith” (Schmidt; Mikkelson et al. qtd. in Rytter and
Pedersen 2312). This frustration is illustrated in a study revealing that 46 percent of young
immigrants between the ages of fifteen and twenty-nine consider leaving Denmark and starting a
new life elsewhere (Shakoor and Riis qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2312). In general the broad use
of the term ‘radical’ may have contributed to exclusion and stigmatization of the Muslim
community, and heightened the risk of producing the very “counter society reaction they
intended to prevent” (Rytter and Pedersen 2313). Now, some Muslims have decided to call Syria
and Iraq their home – opting to fight as jihadists in extremist groups such as ISIS.
In yet another flurry of political campaigns, this time implemented by the Ministry of
Integration and some of the largest municipalities against radicalization, anti-radicalization
campaigns “applied categories and definitions that were so broad that many (often young)
Muslims found themselves [being] categorized as ‘radicalized’” (Kuhle qtd. in Rytter and
Pedersen 2313) – thus making them the target of radicalization prevention programs in
Denmark. With such high attention on Muslim youth, a much larger debate has begun on
whether the security/integration response has resulted in larger incidences of discrimination
against the Muslim youth in Denmark (Kublitz qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2313). Using
information cited from interviews and focus groups conducted with Muslim youth, I will explain
the Muslim perception of the impact of the security/integration response on their identity,
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everyday social interactions and sense of belonging. I will also discuss the concept of
‘radicalization’ and how the Danish government seeks to combat it. Finally I will end with a
discussion of whether or not the policies and practices employed against Muslim minorities in
Denmark have contributed to the rise in radicalization within the Muslim population.

The Effects of the Security/Integration Response
Since 9/11, the visibility of Danish Muslims, especially Muslim youth, has become one in
which Muslim youth are subjected to “the omnipotent gaze and pressure of external
expectations...” (Christiansen; Khawaja qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2314). In a study of Muslim
youth in Copenhagen, psychologist Iram Khawaja suggests, “Muslims have become hypervisible in the Danish landscape” (Rytter and Pedersen 2313). The security/integration response
has cast a “panoptic gaze” on Muslims from “the majority, the media and the state (with which
they must constantly comply)” (qtd in Rytter and Pedersen 2313) and has impacted the everyday
lives of Muslims in Denmark. As Asad, a young informant in her study, explains:
I feel sort of surveilled. You can’t just walk around and think, hey, I’m just me.
Of course, you want to be yourself, but there is always this external pressure that
makes you think: I have to behave, I have to behave, I have to behave, behave
(qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen; as translated by Rytter and Pedersen 2313).
For some Muslim youth, hyper-visibility may become a creative way through which they
can signal their identity (Christiansen; Khawaja qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2314). This is
particularly so for Muslim children in Denmark, who during this post 9/11 buzz surrounding
Muslims and the Islamic faith, have been “met with questions about their religion and are asked
to defend a faith with which they are still becoming accustomed” (Schmidt; Gilliam qtd. in
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Rytter and Pedersen 2314). “It is likely that this will affect how they view their own position and
belonging as Muslims in Danish society” (Rytter and Pedersen 2314).
For Muslim youth, however, especially those who have made an effort to be active in
Danish society on the local and national levels, there is some withdrawing from the public
sphere. “Alongside hyper-visibility, there [also] seems to be a process of silencing developing”
(Rytter and Pedersen 2314) as many Muslim youths have “been confronted with their stance on
the death penalty and have been asked to denounce sharia. This latter demand in particular has
caused many Muslims to resign from their positions and withdraw from the political scene”
(Hervik; Jorgensen 2314). The monitoring of Muslim beliefs and behavior, as well as popular
sentiment about how Muslims should behave, makes true integration difficult because of the
prevalent perception of Muslims as threats.

The Transnationalization of Islam: Where Do Muslims ‘Belong’?
The presence of Muslims in the political scene post 9/11 in response to the political
climate was largely evidenced through two Muslim groups, Hizb ut-Tahir (The Party of
Liberation) and Muslimer i Dialog (Muslims in Dialogue), who take different approaches to how
Muslims in Denmark should navigate their encounters with the majority. Hizb ut-Tahir
stalwartly encourages its members to “isolate themselves and avoid contact with the Danish
secular democratic society, which is seen as decadent and immoral [whereas] Muslimer i Dialog
“encourages discussions about identity, integration and the rights of Muslims in Denmark”
(Sinclair 51). Despite their differences, both groups emphasize the importance of having a
“network” and a sense of belonging (Sinclair 49).
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This is linked to Muslim concept of ummah, which is seen as a “very important element
of being a practicing Muslim...” (Sinclair 50). This is based on the concept of transnationalism,
in which the “global brotherhood of the ummah transcends national borders and citizenship and
so belonging to the ummah means being part of a movement that reaches back in history and
reaches out into the future and transcends time and space (Sinclair 50). On a psychological level,
being a member of the ummah means that the individual has become part of something greater
than one’s self (Sinclair 50).
In “Islam in Britain and Denmark: Deterritorialized Identity and Reterritorialzied
Agendas,” Kristine Sinclair assumes that through transnationalization, members of Hizb ut-Tahir
and Muslimer i Dialog are “turning to an Islam that is detached from the migrant generations’
Muslim homelands, just as they construct transnational identities and networks. The groups have
chosen “Islam” as “homeland” over any concrete nation state” (51). Therefore, “ummah is
understood as disengaged from specific national concepts” (51). With the continuous
disenfranchisement of Muslims in Denmark, and the rise in groups such as Hizb ut-Tahir, I
contend that Denmark’s effort for securitization may have come at the cost of integration of
Muslims in Denmark, who may already feel like they don’t belong. The domestic consequences
of dislocation and alienation may have led to the surge of Muslim youth leaving Denmark to
fight for extremist organizations in Syria and Iraq.

Terrorists Created? : The Increase in Radical Muslim Fighters from Denmark
In “Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical,” Louise Stigsgaard Nissen recounted her
meeting with Abu Dinamarqi and Abu Tareq, both 23-year old Danes with Arab and ArabPalestinian roots, who left Denmark to join the radical group ISIS. In the article, Nissen rejects
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the generalized portrayal of radicalized Muslims in the media, and discusses what she calls a
more “prismatic reality” behind the motivations that propel some Muslims to these extremist
groups. According to Nissen, “there are some who have lived their whole lives in Syria, who
have watched their houses bombed by Bashar al-Assad’s forces and see ISIS as a default option
to the regime; there are some who fight alongside ISIS because they have no other source of
income; there are some who find solace in the relative order brought by ISIS; there are some who
trek from stable democracies, like Abu Tareq did, drawn by the lure of an indefinable utopia”
(“Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical”).
Magnus Ranstorp, the Research Director of the Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies at
the Swedish National Defense College, says, “Jihad is a whole new identity amongst these
youngsters in Scandinavia” (Nissen, “Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical”). He adds, “They
have been defined by the war on Islam and the war on terrorism. They feel excluded” (Nissen,
“Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical”). Ranstorp’s statements are supported by Abu Tareq’s
words in his interview with Nissen when he said, “When I saw ISIS raising their black flag in
northern Raqqa – huge, fluttering in the wind with white signs – I was very sentimental. I felt
that this is my identity. I don’t feel I belong in Denmark” (Nissen, “Inside ISIS: The Making of a
Radical”). In the same interview, Abu Tareq also said, “I don’t really feel that Denmark is my
home. Mentally, I’m in Raqqa” (Nissen, “Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical”).
Unlike researchers, the Danish police have a different explanation for the increase in
fighters leaving Denmark to join ISIS in Syria. Allan Aarslev, the head of criminal prevention
with Aarhus Police, described the increased Muslim exodus to Syria as a “trend amongst these
young people” (Nissen, “Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical”). He continued, “They feel that
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Muslims have been under attack after 9/11. The attraction is to be a part of the war in Syria, to be
seen as active and cool” (Nissen, “Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical”).
Nissen also notes that the feelings and choices of Abu Dinamarqi, Abu Tareq and other
Danish fighters in ISIS and other groups do not represent the entire Muslim population in
Denmark. I second Nissen’s assertion; not all second generation Muslim immigrants are attracted
to the idea of fighting for ISIS or any other extremist group, nor are they interested in leaving
Denmark. Therefore, I cannot generalize radicalization as the choice for all Muslim youth living
in Denmark who have had unfavorable experiences socially or via policy. Nonetheless, for
countries such as the United States and other European countries, the dramatic growth in ISIS
fighters is alarming because of the fear that these fighters may return to their countries and
commit acts of terrorism on their native soil (Nissen, “Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical”).
For Denmark in particular, this a grave concern since Denmark “has produced more
fighters per head of population since 2012 than any other Western European country except
Belgium” (Crouch and Henley, “A Way Home for Jihadis”). There have also been at least four
cases in which Danes have been involved in acts of terror – the first being in November 2013
when “a Danish-born suicide bomber, a blonde convert named Victor Kristensen, blew himself
up in an ISIS mission in Iraq. Since then, three other Danish citizens, two of them Danish-Arab
and one Danish-Pakistani, have committed suicide attacks for Islamic extremist groups in the
Middle East” (Nissen, “Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical”).

Radicalization Prevention Measures
Denmark’s efforts at strengthening its security measures were greatly heightened post
9/11; however discourse on radicalization was still prominent. Following the initial
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implementation of the security/integration response, Denmark ushered in another counter
radicalization initiative in 2009. This project, also known as the government’s action plan, was
called “A Common and Safe Future.” “ A Common and Safe Future” was to be overseen by the
Center for Prevention, a sector of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET). According
to the PET, the goal of the program was to “encourage people to change their behaviour towards
a non-extremist direction by means of direct contact and dialogue. The idea [was] for PET to
support the actors that are best placed to reach vulnerable people by equipping them with tools
for tackling the difficult challenges” (“The Centre for Prevention”).
When outlining its radicalization prevention initiative, the Danish government used the
standard definition of radicalization, which is, “the process in which a person gradually accepts
the ideas and methods of extremism and, possibly, joins its organised [sic] groups. Personal
circumstances, group dynamics as well as political, financial and cultural factors may all
contribute to radicalisation [sic] processes” (Government of Denmark). Additionally, the
government’s packet rejected the idea that Denmark is “hostile towards– or outright waging war
against – Islam or Muslims” and instead noted that there is a common concern that radical
Islamism is threatening to Muslims and non-Muslims alike (Government of Denmark).
The action plan also discusses the “negative and distorted perception” of Denmark that
has emerged since Denmark’s involvement in the war on terror, and asserts that the government
works to promote the “fundamental values of freedom, security and opportunities for all, and
fight the forces that want violence, hatred and oppression” both domestically and internationally
(Government of Denmark). According to the document, these goals are being pursued through
initiatives such as counter-terrorism, international co-operation on peace, development and
democracy (as demonstrated through the fight against poverty in Africa, the overall engagement
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in Afghanistan, the Danish-Arab Partnership Programme, the long-term political commitment to
ensure a just and viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, etc.) (Government of
Denmark).
Lasse Lindekilde, a researcher in the Department of Political Science at Aarhus
University in Denmark, notes that   “A Common and Safe Future" has been targeted towards
Muslims, thus suggesting that Muslims are deemed to be violence-prone “radicals” who should
be encouraged to become active citizens in Danish society (Lindekilde 110). Lindekilde also
asserted that the action plan would have “inotropic effects” due to its programming structure as
well as its hard focus on Muslims (Lindekelde 110). For Lindekelde, the Danish action plan is
laden with what he calls “a particular concept of the “ideal citizen,” which he Lindekelde
describes as “someone who is responsible and liberal. He also notes that radicalization is the
opposite of this. Therefore, this alternative identity is “negative” (117). He continues to say:
The ideal citizen of the action plan is first and foremost pro-democratic and nonviolent, and non-supportive/non-sympathetic vis-à-vis violent o[f] un-democratic
groups. The ideal citizen is also responsible and active. In several parts of the
action plan active citizenship, in terms of participation in associational life and
democratic procedures, is praised as an important aspect of citizenship. Becoming
such an active citizen who contributes to the common good is framed in the action
plan as an individual responsibility. Thus, ideal citizens not only oppose violent
and undemocratic methods, they also play an active and responsible part in
society (177).
Lindekilde’s line of analysis is evocative of past discourse on integration and
immigration that suggests the existence of a parallel in the discourse between the diction found
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in “A Common and Safe Future” and other material discussed in previous chapters. Also,
Despite the Danish government’s attempt to countering its criticism, I find Lindkelde’s point to
be particularly interesting because it relates closely to the aforementioned statement by the PET,
which says, “…to support the actors that are best placed to reach vulnerable people…” thus
suggesting that there is indeed a target population. With the War on Terror raging against Islamic
radicalism, there is surely a greater focus placed on Muslims.

From Radicalization Prevention to De-radicalization
The “Common and Safe Future” action plan ended in 2012, but the surge of Islamist
radicalism did not; neither did Denmark’s efforts at counter-terrorism. In addition to joining the
United States, Belgium and other states in the military fights against ISIS, Denmark has also
begun a de-radicalization program in 2014 for jihadist fighters returning from Syria.   This
initiative, costing 60.9 million kroner (9.2 million U.S. dollars) (The Associated Press,
“Denmark Spends $9 Million on De-Radicalization Programs”), was the successor to the “A
Common and Safe Future” action plan, and a symbol of Denmark’s evolution from radicalization
prevention to de-radicalization.
According to Ayan Sheikh, a reporter from PBS News Hour, Denmark is not the only
country with a terrorist rehabilitation program. Instead, it has joined countries like Singapore and
Saudi Arabia, who have been offering terrorism habilitation programs to former jihadi fighters
following 9/11 (“Denmark Unveils De-radicalization Program”). Denmark’s terrorist
rehabilitation program is based in Aarhus, Denmark’s second largest city. The program is
designed to follow a more liberal approach, by offering returning fighters and their families a
“wide range of services that include treating psychological trauma and wounds sustained from
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shrapnel and gunshots. Families are put in touch with intelligence agencies and government
officials tasked with bringing their loved ones home. De-radicalized fighters would also receive
help to find jobs and continue with their education” (Sheikh, “Denmark Unveils Deradicalization Program”).
Bharati Naik, Atika Shubert and Nick Thompson from CNN report that “those returning
must be screened by police, and anyone found to have committed a crime will be put through the
courts and possibly prison.” [However], the program does not try to change the fundamentalist
beliefs of the returning fighters – as long as they don’t advocate violence (“Denmark Offers
Some Foreign Fighters Rehab”). Despite this, Sheikh reports that Danish officials in Aarhus have
deemed the program a success, due to the “sharp decrease in the number of Danish nationals
[fleeing] to the Middle East” (“Denmark Unveils De-radicalization Program”). Sheikh also says
that officials saw only 22 reported people join an extremist group in 2013, and only one in 2014
(“Denmark Unveils De-radicalization Program”). Despite what appear to be good reviews of the
Danish de-radicalization program, Denmark has come under scrutiny from countries such as the
U.K, which has a vastly different approach, as illustrated in the image below:
Fig. 2, Denmark Offers Some Foreign Fighters Rehab Without Jail Time – But Will It Work?

CNN. Web. 07 Apr. 2015
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In the U.K, vastly different measures are employed when dealing with returning jihadist
fighters. These measures often involve “surveillance, terror charges and jail time” (Naik, Shubert
and Thompson, “Denmark Offers Some Foreign Fighters Rehab”), as well as efforts to ban
fighters from returning home entirely. This is due to fear of the influx of “home grown terrorists”
who may cause an attack on their native soil (Naik, Shubert and Thompson, “Denmark Offers
Some Foreign Fighters Rehab”). Like Denmark’s “A Common and Safe Future” action plan, the
UK also has radicalization prevention programs, but nothing targeting returning fighters from
Syria (Naik, Shubert and Thompson, “Denmark Offers Some Foreign Fighters Rehab”).
Another reason for the stark differences between both countries is the fact that “It is not
illegal according to Danish law to go to Syria” (Naik, Shubbert and Thompson, “Denmark Offers
Some Foreign Fighters Rehab”). Police Commissioner Jorgen IIum stated that law
enforcement’s inability to stop people from going to Syria did not deter them from trying “to
persuade the young people not to go to Syria.” He added, “We could tell them about the risks
that they might encounter going to Syria. We could tell them about the Danish legislation that
makes it illegal to participate in direct terrorist acts and if they did do [sic] they might be
punished when they come back” (Naik, Shubbert and Thompson, “Denmark Offers Some
Foreign Fighters Rehab”). Naik, Shubbert and Thompson say that the program is designed to
provide reintegration services, but also to keep close watch on returned fighters (“Denmark
Offers Some Foreign Fighters Rehab”).
In defense of the program Jorgen IIum added, “this is not a gift shop. You have to be
motivated; you have to really want to become a part of the Danish society. We help them find a
way through the system, and what we’ve seen is that out of the sixteen who have returned, ten of
them are now back in school and now have a job, and it seems to us that their focus is on
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something else than in Syria” (Shubert, “Denmark’s De-radicalization for Jihadis”). In response
to the approach to tackling the returning fighters’ fundamentalist beliefs, IIum stated, “They are
still Muslim believers, some of them perhaps in a way that we would call ‘radical’ but not to an
extent that (as far as we can see) they are a threat to the society” (Shubert, “Denmark’s Deradicalization for Jihadis”).
Denmark’s de-radicalization initiative is still very new, and there is no way to
definitively gauge the success of this program at this time. However, based on Police
Commissioner IIum’s statements, there seems to be no present concerns about the impact of
Denmark’s decision to rehabilitate its radicalized Muslim fighters on the wider Danish society.
Instead, the combination of assistance and monitoring by the PET seems to suffice. I also would
say that with the focus on integration, the Danish resolve for de-radicalization and reintegration
of its jihadi Muslim groups symbolizes the beginning of a shift in the ways in which the Danes
relate to and interact with the Muslim population. I cannot speak to how this program will impact
Muslims in their daily lives, but I can say that this initiative may indeed be an acknowledgement
of the impact that marginalization and poor integration have had in cultivating the sense of
statelessness and resentment, which would have driven some other Muslims, like Abu Tareq, to
find a place where they would feel welcomed and ultimately to radicalization.
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CONCLUSION

Denmark post 2001 is unlike the nation that we have come to appreciate for its
international involvement in human rights. The shift from liberalism to nationalism, along with
the decade-long leadership of the right wing populist party, DPP, has propagated the need to
protect the Danish customs, in terms of culture, language and social norms. In an effort to
maintain the nation’s security, the Danish government has implemented several domestic
security and integration-focused policies and practices that have targeted Muslims and Muslim
immigrants. In the process, a cross-cultural tension has emerged between the Muslim minority
and the general populous, thus resulting in several clashes that have led to numerous casualties
and an underlying uncertainty about the next act of radical terrorism in Denmark.
In examining the conditions under which immigrants were embraced by Denmark, we see
that the country only extended this welcome in an effort to improve its economic market, while
taking advantage of cheap labor. As Denmark’s economy strengthened and the need for
immigrant lessened, immigrant presence in Denmark evoked negative sentiments from the
general populous. Focusing on the gradual changes in the perceptions of immigrants in Denmark
over time, we see how the socio-cultural and political discourse on immigration helped shape
public sentiments on the role of immigrants in a country that was recovering from economic
shifts, resulting from globalization.
From early on, there was a concern that accepting immigrants with cultural differences
would result in a form of socio-cultural deviance, which contrasted Danish norms. The fear of
multiculturalism, combined with the absence of a structured immigration policy also created
difficulties in assessing how to deal with the influx of immigrants in the 1970’s (Jønsson 593).
With strong anti-immigration rhetoric on the potential dangers posed by people of different
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cultures and religions (Rydgren 484), it is understandable how Islam would not be exempt from
the generalized assumption that people with religious and cultural differences were incompatible
or even threatening to the fiber of Danish society.
Amidst such tension, the DPP was able to grow while fueling the frenzy surrounding the
immigration debate. The fact that a terrorist attack happened in the midst of this chaos was
unfortunate for Muslims, but it was a lucky coincidence for the DPP, which was elected shortly
after 9/11 (and after campaigning heavily against immigration). Given that 9/11was a series of
serious attacks, there was a genuine need for security. Given that 9/11 was carried out by
radicalized Muslim terrorists, there was also a documented reason to ensure public safety against
religiously motivated terrorism which – from an essentialist view – was associated with Islam.
What started as a reaction a tragic and unfortunate event, morphed into a security and integration
focused system, designed to ensure the highest degree of cultural conformity. After 9/11, we saw
the intersection between integration and security, and the amalgam of obstacles the security and
integration measures caused for Muslims living in Denmark, Muslim immigrants, nonNordic/non-Western immigrants, and refugees or asylum seekers at large.
Throughout the paper, we see the gradual changes in the immigration policy, which
became progressively stringent – ultimately reaching its peak in 2010. The incessant discussion
of the duties of immigrants to a society, along with the ever increasing requirements for
obtaining citizenship or permanent residency, display how the lack of multicultural policies have
made the inclusion of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers more difficult (Huysmans 753).
Close examination of Denmark’s immigration policies reveal the varying parameters developed
to measure and ensure the “worthiness” of citizenship and permanent resident applicants outside
of ‘culturally close’ Nordic countries (Mouritsen and Olsen 700). My analysis revealed that a
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“successfully” integrated immigrant/ “good” immigrant was someone who demonstrated
knowledge of the Danish language, culture and social norms, and demonstrated self-reliance
through employment, which would decrease dependence on the welfare state (Jensen et al. 6).
Ultimately, by Danish standards, the people considered “good” immigrants were usually
Christian or from another Nordic countries. Their immigration experience was often easier
because of the “special fast-track naturalization procedures” made available to them by Denmark
(Mouritsen and Olsen 700).
In my discussion of the historic Danish effort to protect Danish Jews from being captured
by Nazis during the Holocaust, my intention was not to undermine the significance of this event,
but to highlight the undercurrents in Danish society at the time, which also contributed to the
gallant endeavor. After examining the motives behind the rescue of Jews from the Nazis, I would
say that the goal of the rescue mission was not entirely about the Jews, nor was it for Danish land
or to overthrow Nazis with the goal of making them irrelevant. The battle for Denmark was a
battle for its soul, and for its “distinctively Danish values and traditions”(Buckser 21). From the
high levels of Jewish assimilation in Denmark, I would say that Jews in some way shared in the
Danish values and traditions. Therefore, in the context of the time, their rescue was more because
of their acceptance as fellow Danes, rather than the fact that they were Jews.
Returning to my larger point about the experience of Jews and Muslims in Denmark, I
hoped to show the parallels between the experiences of Jews from Russia and Eastern Europe in
the 1980s and Muslims today. From the discussion, you see that both these non-assimilated Jews
and Muslims were subjected to derogatory expressions against their culture and religion. Recall,
both groups of people endured offences through caricatures that were drawn in mockery of their
religions; both were deemed outsiders in a Christian nation, etc.
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The 2006 Cartoon Controversy holds particular significance because of the magnitude of
the uproar and backlash against the majority and the Danish government, from the Muslim
community. Here, we begin to see what appears to be the breaking point for the Muslim
community. Arguably, the events that unfolded after this point were inevitable, especially
because the controversy only heightened the pointed criticism of Muslims in the media, while
furthering the negative perceptions that follow Muslims in their everyday lives. In essence, 9/11
furthered the shift in Muslim-majority relations, but the publishing of the cartoons in 2006 was
the spark that triggered a cataclysmic chain of events that would lead to protests and violence in
unimaginable proportions.
What results next can be seen as an illustration of some of the ways in which the Muslim
community opted to cope with their hyper-visibility in the media, following their attempts at self
advocacy. By looking at the different responses to hyper-visibility, I sought to show how instead
of retreating from the public sphere (as some Muslims did), some Muslims chose to make their
home elsewhere altogether, choosing to join extremist groups in countries such as in Iraq and
Syria. Despite the large number of Muslim jihadi fighters in Syria and elsewhere, I cannot assert
that Danish laws and policies focused on Muslims and Muslim immigrants have exclusively
resulted in radicalized Muslim youth. However, I will say that these laws and policies have
resulted in some Muslim youth feeling disconnected – as if they do not belong.
In February 2015, a 22-year old male of Palestinian descent embarked on a shooting
spree that was “the worst terror spree in three decades” (Ritter, “Omar Abdel”). Omar Abdel
Hamid el-Hussein attacked a free-speech seminar, and a synagogue in Copenhagen after he was
released from jail – about two weeks prior to the incident – for viciously attacking a passenger
on the train with a knife (Ritter, “Omar Abdel”). While serving his 15-month sentence, el-
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Hussein allegedly expressed an interest in going to Syria to join ISIS, and PET was called to
monitor him as a potential terror threat (Ritter, “Omar Abdel”). It is unclear what (if any)
counter-radicalization measures were taken to assist el-Hussein, but it is clear that el-Hussein
never actually left Denmark to join ISIS. His radicalization allegedly occurred during his
incarceration where he was inspired by the Charlie Hebdo shootings in Paris, France that killed
17 people (Ritter, “Omar Abdel”). Described as somewhat aggressive, but talented and
incredibly smart, el-Hussein was a rising star at Copenhagen’s Muay Thai kickboxing club and
was also passionate in political discussions about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Chrisafis,
“Copenhagen Shooting Suspect”). El-Hussein’s associates say that he was “not a terrorist [but
instead]…someone who felt finished with life and decided to go out with a big bang” (Chrisafis,
“Copenhagen Shooting Suspect”).
Speaking with Karl Ritter from The World Post, Jesper Braarud Larsen, a Danish court
reporter who covered el-Hussein’s trial in December said el-Hussein didn’t come across as
religious, and had the appearance of a “hardened criminal,” his shaved head pocked by scars
(“Omar Abdel”). Although Mr. Larsen is no counter-radicalization expert, it is notable that he
somehow expected el-Hussein to “come across as religious,” thus suggesting that the essentialist
perception of “religious people” as threats is still evident even today. In the case of el-Hussein,
Angelique Chrisafis from the Huffington Post reports that el-Hussein had a history of cannabis
use and appeared to suffer from anxiety (“Copenhagen Shooting Suspect”). By all accounts, he
was just a Danish-born young man who had lost his way after dropping out of school and later
becoming homeless (Chrisafis, “Copenhagen Shooting Suspect”). El-Hussein’s appearance may
have told quite the tale but – by appearances alone – there is simply no way of determining who
is or isn’t a possible terror threat, as demonstrated by Anders Behring Breivik, a Norwegian far-
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right terrorist responsible for the deaths of 77 people on Utøya island, Norway in 2011.
Moreover, radicalization is not isolated to just Muslims or those of Muslim descent. Counterradicalization efforts must be implemented in such a way that they extend to everyone who could
be a threat, not just “religious” Muslims. By isolating one subset of people, Denmark’s counterradicalization program may be missing chances to counteract other terrorist threats, from sources
where it may be least expected.
In addition to its counter-radicalization efforts, the Danish government has undertaken a
de-radicalization initiative, in what appears to be an effort to entice radicalized fighters to return
to Denmark, and to pursue a life that does not include extremist crime and violence. By offering
resources such as education, housing and employment to returning fighters – through this
optional program – it seems quite plausible that fighters who have not committed any crimes
would be willing to return to Denmark, without fear of prosecution. Known returning fighters are
screened by police, and only face legal action if they have indeed committed a crime, and are
also monitored by Danish intelligence (Naik, Shubert and Thompson, “Denmark Offers Some
Foreign Fighters Rehab”).
Unlike Denmark, France has chosen a more hardline approach to monitoring returning
“Islamists” and other fighters from Syria and Iraq. Focusing on surveillance and meta data
collection, the French government has passed a new surveillance law in the wake of the Charlie
Hebdo attacks. Often compared to the United States’ Patriot Act – which was passed weeks after
the 9/11 attacks – the French law allows authorities to tap phones and emails,	
  spy on the digital
and mobile phone communications of anyone linked to a “terrorist” inquiry (therefore forcing
internet service providers and phone companies to give up data upon request), and place cameras
and recording devices in private homes and install keylogger devices that record every key stroke
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on a targeted computer in real time. The law also allows for mass data collection, which will be
analyzed for “potentially suspicious behaviour” – all this is permitted without a warrant from a
judge (Chrisafis, “France Passes New Surveillance Law”).
The rampant radicalization of Muslims and the increase in the numbers of other militant
fighters have resulted in a number of reactive measures, laws and policies aimed at securing
individual states. With surveillance and mass data collection becoming the new means of
security, the implementation of hardline surveillance laws have raised questions about their
possible infringement on constitutional freedoms and liberties. Beyond this, there is a concern
that the targeted subjects may largely be ethnic and religious minorities. Denmark, like its
European counterparts such as France, the Netherlands and Austria have been enthralled in
controversy surrounding their prominent far-right parties and their issues of border control and
security for many years. Although Denmark’s terrorist securitization policy is not as rigid as
France’s or the UK’s, Denmark’s new de-radicalization program is only in its early stages, and
may require changes in the future.
For now, what is clear about Denmark’s existing laws is that the creation of security and
integration policies – in response to cultural mixing based on migration – became politicized in
the form of challenges to the welfare state (Huysmans 762). Denmark’s effort to thwart “threats”
such as (illegal) immigration, and terrorism have led to the institutionalization of policies and
practices that have produced larger issues surrounding how “outsiders” are viewed and treated.
In this globalized world, migration policy has to address the reality that European countries are
becoming diverse (Huysmans 672). Cultural homogeneity is not being “threatened,” it simply
cannot exist where there is immigration. “The political rendering of cultural identity involves a
mixture of issues including multiculturalism, European identity nationalism, and xenophobia and
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racism” (Huysmans 762). The result is a cultural war, which raises questions about the European
approach to culture and racial identity, and their role in the politics of inclusion (Huysmans 761).
Moreover, the pattern of labeling particular categories of people as a danger has not just made
the inclusion of immigrants (Muslim and non-European), refugees and asylum-seekers more
difficult, but has also impacted “the kind of solidarity, social integration, cultural identity,
civility and public order that is promoted in the community” (Huysmans 771).
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APPENDIX
RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES – DENMARK

International Bill of Human Rights

International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights
International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights
Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Second Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, aiming at the abolition
of the death penalty
Prevention of Discrimination on the
Basis of Race, Religion, or Belief; and
Protection of Minorities
International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination
Women's Human Rights
Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against
Women
Optional Protocol to the Convention on
the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women
United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and
Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children,
supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime Preamble,
supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime
Protocol against the Smuggling of
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air,
supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime

Signature

Ratification

Accession

Succession

Entry into Force

20 Mar 1968

6 Jan 1972

20 Mar 1968

6 Jan 1972

20 Mar 1968

6 Jan 1972

13 Feb 1990

24 Feb 1994

Signature

Ratification

Accession Succession Entry into Force

21 Jun 1966
Signature

9 Dec 1971
Ratification

Accession Succession Entry into Force

17 Jul 1980

21 Apr 1983

10 Dec 1999

31 May 2000

12 Dec 2000

30 Sep 2003

12 Dec 2000

30 Sep 2003

12 Dec 2000

Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices
Signature
Ratification
Accession Succession Entry into Force
Slavery Convention
17 May 1927
Protocol amending the Slavery
3 Mar 1954
Convention
(Definitive Sign)
Supplementary Convention on the
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade,
and Institutions and Practices Similar to 27 Jun 1957 24 Apr 1958
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Slavery
Convention for the Suppression of the
Traffic in Persons and of the
Exploitation of the Prostitution of
Others
12 Feb 1951
Protection from Torture, IllTreatment and Disappearance
Signature
European Convention for the Prevention
of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
26 Nov 1987
Protocol No. 1 to the European
Convention for the Prevention of
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
4 Nov 1993
Protocol No. 2 to the European
Convention for the Prevention of
Torture and inhuman or Degrading
Treatment of Punishment
4 Nov 1993
Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment
4 Feb 1985
Rights of the Child
Signature
Convention on the Rights of the Child 26 Jan 1990
Optional Protocol to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child on the
involvement of children in armed
conflicts
7 Sep 2000
Convention concerning the Prohibition
and Immediate Action for the
Elimination of the Worst Forms of
Child Labour
Freedom of Association
Signature
Freedom of Association and Protection
of the Right to Organise Convention
Right to Organise and Collective
Bargaining Convention
Employment and Forced Labour
Signature
Convention concerning Forced or
Compulsory Labour
Equal Remuneration Convention
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention
Discrimination (Employment and
Occupation) Convention
Employment Policy Convention
Convention concerning Occupational
Safety and Health and the Working
Environment
Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families
Not signed
Education
Signature
Convention against Discrimination in
Education

Ratification

Accession Succession Entry into Force

2 May 1989

1 Sep 1989

26 Apr 1994

1 Mar 2002

26 Apr 1994

1 Mar 2002

27 May 1987
Ratification
19 Jul 1991

Accession Succession Entry into Force

27 Aug 2002

14 Aug 2000
Ratification

Accession Succession Entry into Force

13 Jun 1951
15 Aug 1955
Ratification

Accession Succession Entry into Force

11 Feb 1932
22 Jun 1960
17 Jan 1958
22 Jun 1960
17 Jun 1970

10 Jul 1995

Ratification
Ratified

Accession Succession Entry into Force
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Refugees and Asylum
Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees
Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees
Nationality, Statelessness, and the
Rights of Aliens
Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness
Convention relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons
War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity, Genocide, and Terrorism
Convention on the Non-Applicability of
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity
Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court
Law of Armed Conflict
Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field
Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea
Geneva Convention relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War
Geneva Convention relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War
Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol
I)
Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims on
Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II)
Terrorism and Human Rights
International Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages
International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombing
International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism
International Convention for the

Signature

Ratification

28 Jul 1951

4 Dec 1952

Accession Succession Entry into Force

29 Jan 1968
Signature

Ratification

Accession Succession Entry into Force
11 Jul 1977

28 Sep 1954

17 Jan 1956

Signature

Ratification

Accession Succession Entry into Force

Not signed
28 Sep 1949

15 Jun 1951

25 Sep 1998
Signature

21 Jun 2001
Ratification

12 Aug 1949

27 Jun 1951
(rat/acced)

12 Aug 1949

27 Jun 1951
(rat/acced)
27 Jun 1951
(rat/acced)

12 Dec 1977

17 Jun 1982
(rat/acced)

12 Dec 1977

17 Jun 1982
(rat/acced)

12 Dec 1977
Signature

17 Jun 1982
(rat/acced)
Ratification

12 Aug 1949

Accession Succession Entry into Force

Accession Succession Entry into Force
11 Aug 1987

31 Aug 2001

16 Dec 1970

27 Aug 2002
17 Oct 1972
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Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft
International Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against International Protected Persons
U.N. Activities and Employees
Signature
Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations
Convention on the Safety of United
Nations and Associated Personnel
15 Dec 1994
Regional Conventions
Signature
[European] Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms
4 Nov 1950
Protocol to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms
20 Mar 1952
Protocol No.2 to the 1950 European
Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
6 May 1963
Protocol No.3 to the 1950 European
Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
6 May 1963
Protocol No.4 to the 1950 European
Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
16 Sep 1963
Protocol No.5 to the 1950 European
Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
20 Jan 1966
Protocol No.6 to the 1950 European
Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
28 Apr 1983
Protocol No.7 to the 1950 European
Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
22 Nov 1984
Protocol No. 8 to the 1950 European
Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
19 Mar 1985
Protocol No. 9 to the 1950 European
Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
6 Nov 1990
Protocol No. 10 to the 1950 European
Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
25 Mar 1992
Protocol No. 11 to the 1950 European
Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
11 May 1994
Protocol No. 12 to the 1950 European
Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
Not signed
European Convention for the Prevention
of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
26 Nov 1987

1 Jul 1975
Ratification

Accession Succession Entry into Force
10 Jun 1948

11 Apr 1995
Ratification

Accession Succession Entry into Force

13 Apr 1953

3 Sep 1953

13 Apr 1953

18 May 1954

6 May 1963

21 Sep 1970

6 May 1963

21 Sep 1970

30 Sep 1964

2 May 1968

20 Jan 1966

20 Dec 1971

1 Dec 1983

1 Mar 1985

18 Aug 1988

1 Nov 1988

19 Mar 1985

1 Jan 1990

14 Feb 1996

1 Jun 1996

18 Jul 1996

18 Jul 1996

1 Nov 1998

2 May 1989

1 Sep 1989
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Protocol No. 1 to the European
Convention for the Prevention of
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Protocol No. 2 to the European
Convention for the Prevention of
Torture and inhuman or Degrading
Treatment of Punishment
African Regional Conventions
African [Banjul] Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights *
Convention Governing the Specific
Aspects of Refugee Problems in
Africa *
Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights on the
Rights of Women in Africa *
Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on
Human and Peoples' Rights *
African Charter on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child *

4 Nov 1993

26 Apr 1994

4 Nov 1993
Signature

26 Apr 1994
Ratification

1 Mar 2002

1 Mar 2002
Accession Succession Entry into Force

Not signed

Not signed

Not signed

Not signed
Not signed
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